Acuerdos internacionales de cooperación en defensa: ¿nueva oportunidad o amenaza para la soberanía de un Estado?
| Páginas | 283-323 |
| Fecha | 01 Julio 2025 |
| Fecha de publicación | 01 Julio 2025 |
| Autor | Radoslava Brhlíková |
| Materia | Derecho Público y Administrativo |
ARTÍCULO DE INVESTIGACIÓN
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 283
VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIO DICIEMB RE, PP. 283323, 2025
INTERNATIONAL DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENTS NEW
OPPORTUNITY OR THREAT TO A STATE SOVEREIGNTY
Acuerdos internacionales de cooperación en defensa: ¿nueva
oportunidad o amenaza para la soberanía de un Estado?
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
Profesora Asistente de Filosofía y Ciencias Políticas
Universidad de Constantino el Filósofo en Nitra (República Eslovaca)
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-5891-4129
rbrhlikova@ukf.sk
Abstract
The paper aims to analyze the DCA between Slovak Republic and the USA from
the point of view of state sovereignty. These kinds of agreements are nothing
new in the world. Dierent states approach them in dierent variants and
combinations. But the approach of the USA is hegemonic. Agreements with
the US are concluded for the benet of the US and in the interest of the US.
Based on the analysis of Brandon J. Kinne, this paper analyses and compares
bilateral defense cooperation agreements between the USA and the Slovak
Republic. I proceed from the assumption that it is a purely vassal treaty, which
makes Slovakia a second, European Puerto Rico, subordinated to the USA in the
military, but also in the legislative area.
The assumption that the agreement with the USA is a vassal agreement rather
than an agreement between two equal partners is conrmed. The treaty
signicantly limits the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, which contradicts
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which states that “The Slovak Republic
is a sovereign, democratic and legal state”. And therefore, in this case, the Slovak
authorities should follow Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Constitution which states:
“State authorities can act only based on the constitution, within its limits and to
the extent and in the manner established by law”. This means that the relevant
ministry should not have negotiated such an agreement because it contradicts
the constitution, and vice versa, to negotiate an unconstitutional agreement
should have no mandate. Based on this agreement Slovak Republic lost its
sovereignty in several ways. This agreement signicantly aects and disrupts the
sovereignty of the Slovak Republic. In our opinion, this agreement is signicantly
284 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
asymmetric, and favorable to the interests and needs of the stronger party. So
this is an example of a vassal agreement that favors one party over another,
limiting the sovereignty of one party without compensation.
Key words: security; defense; cooperation, sovereignty, the USA, Slovakia.
Resumen
El artículo analiza el Acuerdo de Cooperación en Defensa (ACD) entre la República
Eslovaca y los Estados Unidos desde la perspectiva de la soberanía estatal. Este
tipo de acuerdos no es nuevo en el mundo. Distintos Estados los abordan con
distintas variantes y combinaciones. Sin embargo, el enfoque de los Estados
Unidos es hegemónico. Los acuerdos con los Estados Unidos se celebran en
benecio y en interés de los Estados Unidos. Basado en el análisis de Brandon J.
Kinne, este artículo analiza y compara los acuerdos bilaterales de cooperación
en defensa entre los Estados Unidos y la República Eslovaca. Parto de la base de
que se trata de un tratado puramente vasallaje, que convierte a Eslovaquia en
un segundo Puerto Rico europeo, subordinado a los Estados Unidos tanto en el
ámbito militar como en el legislativo.
Se conrma la suposición de que el acuerdo con los Estados Unidos es un
acuerdo vasallaje y no un acuerdo entre dos socios en igualdad de condiciones.
El tratado limita signicativamente la soberanía de la República Eslovaca, lo
que contradice el artículo 1, párrafo 1, de la Constitución, que establece que
“La República Eslovaca es un Estado soberano, democrático y de derecho”. Por
lo tanto, en este caso, las autoridades eslovacas deberían acatar el artículo 2,
párrafo 2, de la Constitución, que establece: “Las autoridades estatales solo
pueden actuar con arreglo a la Constitución, dentro de sus límites y en la medida
y forma establecidas por la ley”. Esto signica que el ministerio competente no
debería haber negociado dicho acuerdo, ya que contradice la Constitución, y
viceversa, negociar un acuerdo inconstitucional no debería tener competencia.
En virtud de este acuerdo, la República Eslovaca perdió su soberanía de diversas
maneras. Este acuerdo afecta y perturba signicativamente la soberanía de
la República Eslovaca. En nuestra opinión, este acuerdo es signicativamente
asimétrico y favorece los intereses y necesidades de la parte más fuerte. Por lo
tanto, este es un ejemplo de un acuerdo vasallático que favorece a una parte
sobre otra, limitando la soberanía de una de ellas sin compensación.
Palabras clave: security; defense cooperation; sovereignty; the USA; Slovakia.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 285
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
Sumario
1. Introduction. 2. Defense cooperation agreement according to Kinne. 3. DCA between
the USA and Slovakia – the story. 4. DCA between the USA and Slovakia – the document
analysis. 5. Conclusion. Bibliography.
1. INTRODUCTION
The security policy of the state is generally perceived as the protection of state
interests. We consider these to be the values that society, which forms the
living substrate of the state, professes. These values need to be defended,
preserved and replicated. They form the essence of the physical, political and
cultural identity of society in relation to the external environment. It is
necessary to protect and preserve them; they must be superior to the interests
of classes, strata, groups, political parties or minorities and ethnic groups living
on the territory of the given state.1 It is a set of requirements, the fulllment of
which conditions the preservation of state sovereignty.2
It is sovereignty meant as the basic value of the state, understood as the
independence of state power from any other power, or as B odin’s absolute and
permanent power of the state,3 which needs to be protected, and that is the
subject of this contribution. Based on the theoretical analysis of the issue of
bilateral agreements on defense cooperation by Brendon J. Kinne,4 this
contribution analyzes and evaluates the bilateral agreement on defense
cooperation between the USA and Slovakia, very fast ratied by the Slovak
parliament and signend by the Slovak president5 without discussion on 9th of
February 2022 against the will of majority of Slovak citizens.
1 Brhlíková, Radoslava, Bezpečnosť ako národnoštátny záujem v kontexte členstva v Európskej
únii, pp. 69-70.
2 krejčí, Oskar, Mezinárodní politika, p. 645.
3 Bodin, Jean, Six books of the Commonwealth, 1576.
4 Brandon J. kinne is an associate professor of political science at the University of California,
Davis, USA. He focuses on research on political networks, international cooperation and
global security. He published his studies in journals such as International Organization,
American Political Science Review, Journal of Politics, British Journal of Political Science,
International Studies Quarterly, Journal of Conict Resolution. He received his doctorate (PhD.)
in political science from Yale University.
5 In one of the pre-election debates, the president promised that she would never sign this
agreement.
286 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
First part of the contribution presents an analysis of Brendon J. Kinne’s D efense
Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network, which
was published in the journal International Organization in 2018. Based on this
analysis, the contribution denes the basic characteristics of bilateral defense
cooperation agreements (DOS) which are later on applied to the Defense
Cooperation Agreement between the Government of the Slovak Republic and
the Government of the United States of America (DCA) in the second part of
this contribution. The basic assumption of the contribution is that –unlike
Kinne’s analyzed agreements and the characteristics derived from them– the
agreement oered by the American government to Slovak government or any
other east European government shows dierent characteristics. The
assumption is that in the case of Slovakia (or Estonia, Romania, Bulgaria,
Hungary, Czech Republic, Greece) it is more about curtailing the sovereignty of
the state in favor of the interests of the USA than about an agreement between
two equal partners.
2. DEFENSE COOPERATION AGREEMENT ACCORDING TO KINNE
It is surprising that scientic analyzes and studies have so far focused on
various international agreements - especially trade and human rights, but in
the eld of security this has only been done in connection with formal military
alliances.6 However, in the area of security policy, we observe that
governments rarely form new alliances, and the global alliance structure has
been static for decades. However, governments are increasingly actively
approaching the signing of bilateral agreements on defense cooperation,
which, as they are framework and therefore exible contracts, enable them
to institutionalize day-to-day defense relations between themselves and
facilitate large-scale activities such as defense policy coordination, joint
research and development, arms production and arms trade or joint exercises
and training and exchange programs. Since 1980, almost 2,000 such bilateral
6 See for example: Morrow, James D., “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation:
Distribution versus Information”, International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 3, 1994, pp. 387-
423; long, Andrew G., “D efense Pacts and International Trade”, J ournal of Peace Research,
Vol. 40, No. 5, 2003, pp. 537-52; jung, Danielle F. & David A. lake, “Markets, Hierarchies, and
Networks: An Agent-Based Organizational Ecology”, American Journal of Political Science,
Vol. 55, No. 4, 2011, pp. 972-990; Sandler, Todd, “The Economic Theory of Alliances: A
Survey”, Journal of Conict Resolution, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1993, pp. 446-483; walt, Stephen M., The
Origins of Alliances; Mráz, Stanislav, František Poredoš & Peter vršanSký, Medzinárodné právo
verejné; Potočný, Miroslav & J. ondřej, Mezinárodní právo veřejné, weiSSová, Šárk a., Mezinárodní
organizace a režimy.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 287
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
agreements on defense cooperation have been signed in the world, yet these
have not become the subject of academic analysis and professional discussion.7
The Slovak public was excited and outraged by the highly secretive
considerations of signing such an agreement with the United States of America,
which were leaked to the public in 2019, connected with the possibility of the
deployment of American army units on the territory of Slovakia. However,
the academic discussion on this issue did not take place and, if it did, only in the
form of blogs or short reactions, especially on Facebook. Even abroad, no one
addressed this issue until 2018,8 although, despite various commitments in
various economic, security and defense alliances, bilateral agreements on
cooperation in the framework of interstate relations are not unusual, and it is
agreements on defense cooperation (DCA) that are the most common in the
form of such relationships.9 DCAs between the signatories establish broad
legal frameworks aimed at defense. Their goal is to facilitate cooperation in an
area very sensitive to the sovereignty of the state, namely in the coordination
of defense policy, research and development, education and training, in the
organization of joint exercises, in the procurement of military equipment and
weapons in the exchange of classied information. However, no attention was
paid to the investigation and analysis of their content, their impact and
inuence on state sovereignty and state interests, their possible, extensive
impact on national and international security. We are only gradually discovering
the impact of such agreements on the international security environment.
The rst larger study on this issue was published by Brandon J. Kinne in 2018
in the International Organization magazine under the title Defense Cooperation
Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security Network. In this study, by
combining the theory of cooperation and the results of social network analysis,
he constructs a theory about the network diusion of such agreements.10
According to him, the reason is the changes in the global security environment
until the end of the 80s of the 20th century, which caused an enormous
7 kinne, Brandon J., “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Security
Network”, International Organization, Vol. 72, fall 2018, p. 799.
8 Based on my own experience with the topic and to the best of my knowledge, I can state
that there is no political science literature and, most likely, no legal literature on this topic.
9 weiSSová, Šárka, 2008, Mezinárodní organizace a režimy.
10 See also: newMan, Mark E. J., “The Structure and Function of Complex Networks”, SIAM
Review, Vol. 45, No. 2, 2003, pp. 167-256; Fearon, James D., “Bargaining, Enforcement, and
International Cooperation. International Organization”, Vol. 52, No. 2, 1998, pp. 269-305.
288 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
demand for this type of agreement. According to his ndings, the US alone
signed bilateral defense cooperation agreements with dozens of countries at
the end of the Cold War. In 2015, various countries such as Indonesia and
Turkey, South Africa and Liberia or Argentina and Russia signed almost a
hundred such agreements.11 States began to prefer DCAs over alliance
commitments due to their high exibility and eectiveness. They use them to
modernize their armed forces, to respond to common security threats, to create
security umbrellas with like-minded countries. They thus create a diverse,
often unpredictable, criss-crossing network of security relations. Countries
that do not even have a traditional relationship with each other often sign
DCAs among themselves, i.e. historically, nor geographically close.
However, the demand for these agreements alone does not explain their
spread, since in this special case states have to overcome such sensitive issues
as the dilemma of mistrust and distributional conicts in order to cooperate.12
Often these agreements provoke controversies, condemning reactions and
internal political earthquakes, as was the case in 1998, for example, in the case
of the prime minister of Slovenia, who faced accusations of treason after
signing the DCA with Israel, or in the case of the agreement between Iran and
Belarus, which in 2007 a strong reaction from the USA and the European Union.
Because of the DCA between Greece and Armenia, in 1996 a Turkish government
spokesman accused Greece of threatening peace and stability in the region
and of trying to encircle Turkey, and the 1995 agreement between Australia
and Indonesia proved so controversial that it was canceled after four years.13
But what makes these agreements so attractive for states? According to Kinne,
it’s the network’s inuence that makes the DOS oer attractive. Networking
relationships provide governments with information about the credibility of
the partner and the risks associated with asymmetric distribution of prots14.
According Kinne’s interpretation, states prefer to sign DCAs simply because
11 kinne, Brandon J., “Defense Cooperation Agreements…”, cit., p. 800.
12 kydd, Andrew. H., Trust and Mistrust in International Relations; Snidal, Duncan, “Coordination
versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International Cooperation and Regimes”, The
American Political Science Review, Vol. 79, No. 4, 1985, pp. 923-942.
13 kinne, Brandon J., “Defense Cooperation Agreements…”, cit., p. 800.
14 newMan, Mark E. J., “The Structure and Function…”, cit.., pp. 167-256; jung, Danielle F. & David
A. lake, “Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks…”, cit., pp. 972-990.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 289
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
more and more states are signing them. As also emerged from the leaked
diplomatic correspondence, states began to perceive traditional military
alliances as archaic, insuciently reecting the current global security
environment. It was reported by American diplomats that the French
government, soon after Nicolas Sarkozy took oce in 2007, began to consider
its alliance with African states as “apparently absurd and outdated”,15 that
France sought to “radically change the current system of defense agreements”
and replace traditional post-colonial defense pacts with agreements that
would focus on “combating illicit tracking and acts of terrorism” while
encouraging “defense and security cooperation and prioritizing the
strengthening of African peacekeeping capacities”.16 This shift was also
welcomed by African states, and the Comoros, for example, called for a “new
agreement on military cooperation with France” that would not focus on
traditional issues of mutual defense, but on “training and exchange
programs”.17 It is DOS that often provide partners with material benets such
as training, participation in seminars and exercises, mutual exchange of
students, or presence in foreign missions, as well as involvement in the arms
trade or acquisition of certain armaments, as Kinne states. According to him,
two specic network inuences are mainly responsible for the spread of DCA
after the end of the Cold War. The rst is preferential attachment and the
second is triadic closure. By synthesizing them and adding cooperation theory,
Kinne attempts to construct a comprehensive theory describing the birth of
DCAs. Network inuences originate in the outlined information mechanism:
states use other states’ DOS ties to obtain information about possible potential
defense partners, thereby endogenously supporting the further growth of the
global DCAs network.18
Exogenous shifts at the macro level of the global security environment,
including the collapse of the Soviet Union, a decrease in the threat of war
between states (especially in the Euro-Atlantic area) and an increase in security
threats of a non-traditional nature, increased the mutual benets from defense
15 Published by: France’s Changing Africa Policy: Part I (Background and Outline of the New
Policy), Wikileaks: Public Library of US Diplomacy, 1 August 2008.
16 Published by: France’s Changing Africa Policy: Part III (Military Presence and Other Structural
Changes) Wikileaks: Public Library of US Diplomacy, 9 September 2008.
17 kinne, Brandon J., “Defense Cooperation Agreements…”, cit., p. 805.
18 Ibidem, p. 799.
290 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
cooperation, which led to an increase in the demand for DCAs. These system-
wide trends translate into specic dyadic impacts, and states use DCAs to:
1) modernization of its armed forces and improvement of their defense
capacities;
2) improving coordinated responses to common security threats and
3) alignment with communities of like-minded collaborators.19
At the dyadic level, the demand for DCAs depends on whether potential
partners can help each other achieve these goals. States cooperate to achieve
common gains.20 And these agreements are ideal for this because they
essentially establish long-term institutional frameworks for normal bilateral
defense relations, including defense policy coordination, joint military
exercises, working committees and groups, exchanges and training, defense
research and development and procurement. As these are frameworks that are
signed by the government, the details are worked out based on protocols and
implementing legislation. Such exibility is benecial to both parties and
means that DCAs can help improve a country’s traditional defense capabilities
and address such non-traditional threats as terrorism, human tracking, piracy
or cyber security and crime. It is important to emphasize that the DCA do not
contain any commitments regarding the budget, mutual defense and non-
aggression. They are not alliances. Unlike the forms of defense cooperation of
the Cold War era –and here we can talk about the North Atlantic Alliance– this
form is usually highly symmetrical. It mutually binds signatories to a common
set of guidelines.21
But joint prots are only part of the overall picture. We still have to take
information asymmetry into account. States often lack comprehensive and
reliable information about their partner’s credibility and willingness to
cooperate and not unilaterally abuse their partners.22 And since DCAs also
19 Idem, p. 801.
20 liPSon, Charles, “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Aairs”, World Politics,
Vol. 37, No. 1, 1984, pp. 1-23.
21 kinne, Brandon J., “Defense Cooperation Agreements…”, cit.
22 kydd, Andrew H., Trust and Mistrust…, cit.; Snidal, Duncan, “Coordination versus Prisoners’
Dilemma…”, cit., pp. 923-942; grieco, Joseph, Robert Powell & Duncan Snidal, “The Relative-
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 291
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
contain sensitive information about national security, including access to
classied information or information about sophisticated weapons
technologies, the question of trust is appropriate. If states are not sure of the
partner’s reliability and trustworthiness, the willingness to approach DCAs
would be low.23 However, we obser ve the opposite.
Even so, we can conclude that the logic of joint prots does not suciently
explain why, despite persistent mistrust and possible distributional conicts,
states approach these agreements. Kinne believes that by establishing DCAs,
governments reveal their degree of credibility and preferred institutional
patterns to third-party observers,24 who then adopt and replicate that pattern.
This replication overcomes the problem of distrust in cooperation and creates
favorable conditions for new DCAs. Thus, the popularity of DCAs is aected by
the inuence of the network - the relations between one pair of states aect
the relations between other states. Kinne mentions two, already cited, specic
types of network inuence, namely preferential connection, when highly
active states, the so-called nodes, endogenously attract new partners in the
network and triadic termination, when DCA contractual parties share a
connection (relationship) with the same third parties, or with the so-called
“friends of friends” establish direct cooperation. This is the same mechanism
that we observe working on social networks like Facebook, Twitter and others.25
Regarding the basic denition or characteristics of these agreements, Kinne
claims that they are “all-encompassing” agreements, or agreements on
everything possible - from the care of war cemeteries, through student
exchange, joint exercises, to nuclear materials and military cartography. Most
of them are focused on specic threats or problems that arise from unique
historical experiences such as wars, occupations, state failures or colonialism.
Their simple denition would be roughly as follows: they are formal bilateral
agreements that create institutional frameworks for routine defense
cooperation. They contain relatively symmetrical and long-term commitments
Gains Problem for International Cooperation”, American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No.3,
1993, pp. 729-743.
23 Morrow, James D., “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation…”, cit., pp. 387-423.
24 We can talk about the so-called followers, similar to what we observe on social networks.
25 kinne, Brandon J., “Defense Cooperation Agreements…”, cit., p. 802.
292 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
for both sides with an emphasis on coordinating the main areas of defense
policy and promoting people-to-people contacts.26
To determine the basic characteristics of these agreements, we can use the
agreement concluded between France and India from 2006, from which
we deduce:
1) The purpose of this Agreement is to promote cooperation between the
parties in the eld of defense and military capabilities, defense industry,
production, research and development and procurement of defen-
se material.
2) This Agreement establishes a framework that focuses on all cooperation
activities carried out by the Parties in the eld of defense.
3) The forms of such cooperation can be specically dened through agree-
ments between the relevant ministries of the contracting parties.27
From these three basic characteristics, the specic characteristics of these
agreements can be further derived, namely:
1) DCAs are always framework agreements. A framework is understood as “a
legally binding treaty... that sets out broad obligations for the contracting
parties and a general system of governance, leaving more detailed rules
and the setting of specic objectives either to subsequent agreements
between the parties, usually referred to as protocols, or to national
legislation”.28 That is, that they only establish general procedures and their
fulllment requires additional tools. Therefore, they are often described by
responsible ocials as “legal umbrellas”.
26 kinne, Brandon J., “Defense Cooperation Agreements…”, cit., pp. 802-803.
27 See and compare: Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the
Government of the Republic of India on Defense Cooperation, signed 20 February 2006,
New Delhi. This agreement, unlike the American-Slovak or other east European agreements
with the USA, has a total of 5 pages.
28 Matz-lück, Nele, “Framework Agreements”, In Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International
Law, Vol. 4, pp. 220-224.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 293
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
2) DCAs emphasize day-to-day interactions in areas of defense such as
mutual consultation and coordination of defense policy; joint exercises,
training and education; coordination in peacekeeping operations; defense
research and development; defense industrial cooperation; arms
procurement; and security of classied information. The aim is therefore to
support cooperation on a quasi-daily basis in specied areas. It is in no way
a mutual defense commitment.
3) On the basis of the DCAs, bilateral committees, working groups and other
mechanisms to support cooperation are usually established. Many also
require the development of annual defense cooperation plans detailing
joint summits, policy goals, exercises, and exchanges or pending contracts.
4) The language and content of the agreements can be assessed as highly
symmetrical, and terms such as “parties” and “signatories” are used instead
of proper names.
5) These are long-term agreements with duration of 10 years, many are
concluded indenitely.
6) Partners often sign several DCAs, so they can replace the previous
agreement or prefer a gradual approach when they single out individual
problem areas in separate agreements.29
In his study, Kinne states that in the period 1980-2010, about half of the
countries that signed the DCAs in that period subsequently concluded at least
one other agreement. These subsequent DCAs are new legal instruments, not
additions or changes to the original agreement. In no agreement examined by
him do we nd a request by one party to temporarily or permanently place a
military unit or base on the territory of the other party, thereby limiting the
sovereignty of one over the other. None of these agreements generally say
anything about the deployment of one party’s troops on the other’s territory
and vice versa.30 Kinne is optimistic about the issue of DCAs in general, as a
new possible form of cooperation in the eld of defense, and it could therefore
be concluded that it could be a way to eliminate conicts between states. Yes,
it could be, however, if there was perfect information and trust in the partner
29 kinne, Brandon J., “Defense Cooperation Agreements…”, cit., pp. 803-804.
30 Ibidem.
294 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
when concluding them, and if the states approached it as equal partners
without ulterior motives, in an eort to gain advantages for themselves, or
from the position of a hegemon to completely dominate a vassal militarily and
politically. Such optimistic new agreements are certainly not the agreements
proposed by the US side to the countries of the former Eastern bloc.
3. DCA BETWEEN THE USA AND SLOVAKIA – THE STORY
At the beginning of 2019, the public in Slovakia was outraged by the
information that the Slovak government was negotiating with the USA on a
bilateral agreement on defense cooperation, which would legalize the
presence of American troops on the territory of Slovakia.31 The document,
which has long been speculated about and even claimed to not exist, dates
back to 2017 and was leaked to the public copied on a copier at high speed. In
response to public pressure, the Ministry of Foreign Aairs and European
Aairs of the Slovak Republic stated that the Agreement on Defense
Cooperation with the USA will enable expanded defense cooperation between
Slovakia and the USA and was also a condition for the provision of a nancial
contribution from the USA for the modernization of the Sliač and Kuchyňa
military airports in the amount of 46 million USD in the framework of the so-
called European Deterrence Initiative (EDI), which was rst mentioned by US
President Barack Obama at the NATO summit in Warsaw in 2016. However, it
gradually became clear that the initiative to conclude such an agreement
came primarily from the American side and is exclusively in the American
interest, as evidenced by an article in the professional magazine Defense News
with the telling title “US Air Force tests ‘base in a box’ in Poland to prep for future
wars”, which does not only talk about Poland;32 as well as the material of the US
Department of Defense, which sets aside nancial items for the modernization
of American bases not only on the American continent, but also in countries
where there are still no ocial American bases, such as Slovakia.33
31 In addition to Slovakia, Iceland and Norway, similar oers from the USA were also addressed
to Hungary, Latvia, Estonia, Romania, Malta, Luxembourg and Bulgaria. In all these cases, it
is about building US military bases or facilitating the presence of US soldiers on the territory
of the addressed states.
32 inSinna, Valerie, “US Air Force tests ‘base in a box’ in Poland to prep for future wars”, DefenseNews,
August 27, 2018, dostupné na: https://www.defensenews.com/air/2018/08/27/us-air-force-
tests-base-in-a-box-in-poland-to-prep-for-future-wars/
33 See: DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE: Fact Sheet on Section 2808 Funding Pool, p. 12.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 295
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
After the document was scandalously leaked to the public and there was
widespread angry public discussion about it, even the representatives of the
Ministry of Defense came to the opinion that DCA is signicantly asymmetrical
in favor of the USA, what can be read also from the explanatory material of the
American side, according to which Slovakia is asked to host US troops –not
NATO troops!– and the distribution of the so-called nancial aid for the
modernization of the airports in Kuchyňa and Sliač in the ratio of 25 to 77% in
favor of the USAF, while up to 56% of these funds are to go to build ammunition
warehouses in Kuchyňa.34 That was why Ministry of Defense of the Slovak
Republic withdrew from the negotiations in 2017 on the grounds that this
oer does not reect the operational requirements of the Armed Forces of the
Slovak Republic and at the same time that the conclusion of this agreement
threatens Slovakia with a signicant limitation of sovereignty and the
occupation of Slovakia’s territory by foreign troops “and moreover without , to
determine the number of American soldiers, the numbers of military
equipment, as well as material without specifying the type and specic
purpose”, and that the members of the US Army, civilian components, their
family members and American contractors are unreasonably favored
“compared to the members of the armed forces of the member states NATO”.
The Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic also stated that the US oer in
accordance with the EDI program was focused exclusively on the construction
of facilities, or objects that serve as a priority for the deployment of members
of the American army, military equipment and material, or use for any purposes,
and therefore does not meet the requirements of the Armed Forces of the
Slovak Republic, nor the requirements of NATO.35
The then social democratic Slovak government and Parliament subsequently
rejected this agreement. And it was not discussed or talked about it. But then
the elections came. The issue of DCA became the subject of the presidential
and later parliamentary election campaigns. The future progressive President
Zuzana Čaputová, literally said in the election campaign in 2019: “I do not see
a reason for the permanent presence of foreign troops in Slovakia. I want
Slovakia to be a reliable and solidary ally within NATO, and today it means
mainly focusing on the real and transparent modernization of our army. This is
34 inSinna Valerie, “US Air Force tests ‘base in a box’ in Poland…”, cit.; DEPAR TMENT OF DEFENSE:
Fact Sheet on Section 2808 Funding Pool, cit.
35 Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic [ The Ministry of Defense has ended negotiations
on money from the US…] ocial page, 2019. This page is no longer available today (2024).
296 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
our main role”. Already at that time she laid, in 2022 she expressly fast signed
the DCA, without any objections and control, whether it is contrary to the
Constitution of the Slovak Republic.36
Also, future Prime Minister Matovič made an oral promise at one of his many
press conferences during election campaign 2020 that, if it should ever happen
that DCA will be approved, it will not be without a nationwide referendum.
During this statement, future Minister of Defense Naď stood behind Matovič.
Even Matovič lied. The right wing Government of the Slovak Republic, on the
initiative of Naď and Korčok in 2021, approved the DCA without assessing and
analyzing a number of comments from the interdepartmental comment
procedure and despite the public resistance, and sent it for approval to the
Parliament. Even the General Prosecutor’s Oce of the Slovak Republic rejected
the agreement with the USA as a whole, in the interdepartmental comment
procedure. It applied 35 fundamental comments. It has to be noted that
Minister Naď included the draft of this agreement for comment during the
Christmas and New Year holidays, in order to prevent a broad public debate.
His intention was to shorten the time prescribed for comments, and that the
draft of this agreement would escape public attention. The right wing majority
in the Parliament approved it, after a thwarted discussion, rejected hearing of
the General Prosecutor with 35 objections against and big pressure on MPs
from Minister Naď. The same day, it was expressly signed by President Čaputová,
despite the calls on her to send the DCA for a review to the Constitutional
Court whether it is in accordance with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
It was passed without the promised referendum.
Jaroslav Naď, together with President Zuzana Čaputová and Foreign Minister
Ivan Korčok, rushed, after the elections and government change, as soon as
possible to accept DCA, which rightly can be described as an “invitation letter”–
which dislocates foreign, alien army in Slovakia for many years which will not
be a subject to the control of Slovak authorities, with a high probability of the
presence of nuclear weapons– to concrete and to enforce their vision of the
world and the direction of foreign policy of the Slovak Republic in the future.37
Let´s remind once again that the representatives of the Ministry of Defense of
the Slovak Republic refused to deal with the comments, objections and
reservations of both the professionals and citizens of the Slovak Republic.
36 Brhlíková, Radoslava, “Hľadanie tváre zahraničnej politiky Slovenska po roku 1989”, Nitra, 2023.
37 Ibidem.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 297
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
4. DCA BETWEEN THE USA AND SLOVAKIA –
THE DOCUMENT ANALYSIS
DCA between the USA and the Slovak republic is a signicantly asymmetric
agreement, shifted signicantly in favor of the USA, which talks about the
legalization of the deployment of units of the Armed Forces of the USA on
the territory of Slovakia. Nowhere does it mention mutual cooperation, student
exchanges, joint procedures and exercises, training and education, coordination
in peace operations, the establishment of joint committees and commissions,38
as we would expect based on Kinne’s analysis. However, it talks about the
deployment of foreign troops on the territory of Slovakia and their legal status,
the rights of the American side and the obligations of the Slovak side. It literally
refers to the exemption of the US Armed Forces, their contractors, family
members and other persons from both the criminal and civil jurisdiction of
Slovakia, as well as exemption from tax and customs duties for ocial and
private purposes. While the Defense Cooperation Agreement between the
Government of France and the Government of the Republic of India has ve
pages, is signed by the Ministers of Defense of both countries, and at rst sight
it is clear that it is a typical framework agreement signed by equal partners as
described by Kinne in his study, the agreements between the USA and Slovakia
have more than thirty pages. In it, Slovakia sounds like a vassal territory, so it is
an asymmetric document, clearly favoring and prioritizing the interest and
benet of the USA, with a signicant impact on geopolitical contexts, because
this agreement made Slovakia, its territory and its inhabitants an easy target in
a possible future regional or global conict character. According to the
agreement, the US armed forces are stationed in the area of Sliač airport and
Kuchyňa airport, where they also plan to build ammunition warehouses, i.e. in
areas where the population density in Slovakia is among the highest.39
Slovakia undertakes to lease both airports to the US Armed Forces for a period
of 10 years, with the provision that after this period the agreement will
automatically continue. It is possible to terminate it, but not immediately, and
38 Joint commissions and committees are to be established, for example, on the basis of an
agreement between France and India, as stated in: Agreement between the Government of
the French Republic and the Government of the Republic of India on Defense Cooperation,
signed 20 February 2006, pp. 3 and 4.
39 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Government of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 2, point 6.
298 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
only on the basis of the annual notice period.40 Moreover, DCA cannot be
terminated without US consent. This agreement is an international treaty of a
military nature, which directly establishes rights and obligations not only for
natural persons and legal entities, but also for the state.
Article 2 of the Agreement denes the basic terms, conditions and principles
of the deployment of not only American soldiers on the territory of the state,
but also their families, civilian employees and contractual partners. This brings
with it the open question of the possibility of housing all these people near the
bases. But what is missing in this article is the so-called nuclear insurance, but
which, for example, Turkey has. The American army is present on territory of
Turkey at the Incirlik base, and the agreement has a paragraph according to
which the storage of nuclear weapons on Turkish territory will be possible
exclusively and only with the consent of the Turkish government and on the
condition that the Turkish inspection has free access to warehouses with this
type of weapons.41
At the same time, Article 2 point 6 provides that both parties shall have
common access to and joint use of agreed facilities and premises, except for
those portions which the parties or their executive representatives specically
reserve for the exclusive access and use of the United States Armed Forces.
According to Article 2 point 7 the term “executive representative” includes: for
the Slovak Republic the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic or an
authorized representative, for the USA: the US Department of Defense or
an authorized representative. In other words, based on such legislation,
the Sl ovak Republic will lose complete control over part of its territory during
the entire period of validity of this agreement.
Article 3 states that Slovakia will provide the USA with two types of objects and
land; these will be objects and land shared jointly with the Slovak Armed Forces
and objects and land intended exclusively for the US Armed Forces, where the
Slovak side will have access only based on the consent of the American side. It is
supposed to concern American weapons warehouses, which are likely to contain
missiles with a at ight path, or nuclear weapons. The cost of repairing buildings,
as well as the construction of new buildi ngs, will be under the direction of the
40 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 30.
41 The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement-U.S. Interests and Turkish Needs, 1982.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 299
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
American side, but Slovakia undertakes to speed up and facilitate the issuance
of land and building permits for the American army and its contractors. The
Slovak side basically provides all required items to the American side free of
charge, “... without requiring rent or similar fees”.42 The Slovak side leaves the
entry and control of access to the agreed objects to the American side, and
even “facilitates temporary access and use of public lands and objects
(including roads, ports and airports) that are not part of the agreed objects
and spaces, including those that are in owned or under the control of the
Slovak Republic, or local government, as well as temporary access and use of
private land and facilities (including roads, ports and airports)... and that free
of charge”. In relation to this it should be noted that: a) the property right of all
owners has the same legal content and protection (the content of the property
right is dened by § 123 of the Civil Code), and that b) according to Art. 20
par.4 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic, forced restriction of property
rights is possible only to the extent necessary and in the public interest, based
on the law (not an international treaty) and for adequate compensation.43
According to Article 2 par. 2 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic state
bodies may act only on the basis of the constitution, within its limits and to the
extent and in the manner established by law. However, no law establishes how
to proceed with the forced limitation of the property right of natural persons
and legal entities, including the property right of self-governing regions and
municipalities, to land and facilities that will be used by the US armed forces or
their suppliers based on an international treaty. Law no.282/2015 Coll. on
the expropriation of land and buildings and on the forced limitation of the
ownership right to them does not apply to such forced limitation of
the ownership right.44
The overall nancing as well as the operation is to be carried out in accordance
with the American regulations.45 With this article, Slovakia would actually,
among other things, have to limit the exercise of the rights (sovereignty) of not
42 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 3, point 5.
43 Žilinka, Maroš, PLNÉ ZNENIE PREJAVU M.ŽILINKU: Poslanci mu neumožnili vystúpiť v
NRSR. 2022.
44 Ibidem.
45 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 3, point 3.
300 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
only municipalities, but also of its own citizens in favor of the Americans! The
US will not fully, and perhaps not at all, cover the costs of the construction
and development of the agreed facilities and premises, which will be
provided exclusively for the use of its armed forces, or the costs of their
operation and maintenance.46 In addition, according to Article 3 point 9
nancing of construction projects implemented by the US Armed Forces must
comply with US laws and regulations. Ultimately, this means that according to
this Article nothing prevents the Slovak Republic from paying from its state
budget all costs for the construction and development of agreed facilities and
premises intended for exclusive use by the US armed forces, as well as the costs
of their operation and maintenance. It also follows from the wording of Article
29 point 1 of DCA, which stipulates that all activities under this agreement are
subject to the availability of resources and funds allocated for these purposes.47
From all this it follows that:
a) The Slovak Republic waives its sovereign rights on its territory when it
transfers the exercise of its right to enter facilities and premises on its
territory provided for the exclusive use of the US armed forces, for example,
even if the law enforcement authorities have evidence that, that a crime
was committed in these facilities and premises,
b) The Slovak Republic waives its sovereign rights on its territory when it
restricts its right to enter premises facilities on its territory, which, according
to the agreement, it uses jointly with the US armed forces, because it
authorizes the US armed forces to coordinate the entry of its bodies into
these facilities and premises, for example, even if the law enforcement
authorities have evidence that a crime was committed in these facilities
and premises.
46 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 3, point 8.
47 The Slovak Republic already has many years of negative experience regarding the use of
land by the US Embassy in Bratislava and its fencing. To this day, this problem has not been
properly resolved despite the repeated friendly approach of the Slovak Republic. So why
should Slovakia believe that the United States of America will properly pay signicantly higher
costs according to this agreement, when it is already included in the text of the agreement
itself that it is possible to “agree” otherwise. In other words, the U.S. commitment that
the U.S. will share proportionately in the cost of construction and development of agreed
facilities and spaces for shared use is vague. By agreement with the Ministry of Defense of
the Slovak Republic, they can waive the obligation to pay any costs
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 301
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
Here, the DCA comes into conict with the Constitution of the Slovak Republic,
since bilateral contracts of a military nature are covered by Article 7,
paragraphs4 and 5 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic. This means that
the Slovak Republic cannot give up its sovereignty or limit its sovereignty
and transfer the exercise of part of its rights to another state through bilateral
treaties. The Slovak Republic can only transfer the exercise of part of its rights:
– according to Article 7 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic
(on the basis of a free decision to enter into a state union with other states,
namely by a constitutional law that will be conrmed by a referendum),
– according to Article 7 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic
(to the European Union, namely by an international treaty ratied and
declared in the manner established by law or on the basis of such a treaty),
– according to Article 7 paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic
(by joining the organization of mutual collective security, for example NATO).48
A Solomonic solution brings Article 4, in which in the rst paragraph the Slovak
side demands that the American side inform it in advance about “temporarily
located materials”,49 but in the very second paragraph it is said that the control
of warehouses and stored material has the sole and exclusive competence of
only and only the American side. Through the agreement, the American side
also gains access to all types and methods of material transportation by road,
river, rail, and air, as well as unhindered access to common areas.50 It can import
and export basically anything that will be labeled as US material. So, it means
that the US Armed Forces will therefore be authorized to transport, deploy and
store military equipment, military supplies and military material throughout
the territory of the Slovak Republic, after mutual agreement but DCA does not
specify with whom and in what form this agreement should be concluded;
perhaps it is an agreement with the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic
–if so, it is questionable whether the ministry will ask the government or the
president for prior consent to conclude such an agreement.
48 Žilinka, Maroš, PLNÉ ZNENIE PREJAVU M.ŽILINKU..., cit.
49 That is ammunition, rockets, bombs, even nuclear bombs…
50 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 4.
302 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
Also, the US Armed Forces will have exclusive control over their military
installations, military supplies, and military materiel. According to the
agreement, planes, vehicles and vessels operated by the US armed forces or for
the US, i.e. also of other countries, will be able to move freely throughout the
territory of the Slovak Republic. Legal regulation on the basis of which they
should inform the Ministry of Defense of the Slovak Republic about the types,
quantities and delivery schedules of deployed material that the US armed
forces intend to transport or deploy on the territory of the Slovak Republic, as
well as about the US suppliers who will make such deliveries, is basically
irrelevant. Not only does failure to fulll this obligation have no legal
consequences, but the Slovak side will not be able to inuence or control at all
what military equipment, what types and quantity of weapons will be imported
and placed on the territory of the Slovak Republic.
It is clear from the above that it is a violation of the sovereignty of the Slovak
Republic, which, contrary to Article 7 of the Slovak constitution transfers part
of the exercise of the rights of the Slovak Republic to a foreign state. Slovakia
loses control over military equipment, means of transport, weapons,
ammunition and other military material of a foreign state located on the
territory of the Slovak Republic. The Slovak Republic will not be entitled to
control their import and export, their use or the purpose of their import, export
or use. In other words, with this treaty, the Slovak Republic leaves its territory
to a foreign state for military purposes, outside the framework of collective
defense through NATO. DCA ignores the possibility of deployment of nuclear
weapons, chemical weapons and biological weapons on the territory of
Slovakia. The Slovak authorities will not be notied and will not know whether
such weapons are deployed on the territory of Slovakia.
Article 5 is also interesting, which says that all buildings, whether repaired or
newly built, “remains the property of the Slovak Republic”, but the American
side retains access to them even if the agreement ceases to apply, or “as long
as their” The US Armed Forces “need”. In that case, it would mean that Slovakia
will not be able to object if the American side decides to relocate any unit to its
territory. This policy is known as Permanent Strategic Access (PSA) and is a tool
by which the US essentially circumvents international law and international
agreements on military base registrations. Of course, this instrument is not
explicitly named in the examined agreement, so it is really necessary to read it
very carefully. Paragraph 2, in turn, states that the American side will indeed
return all buildings and land to Slovakia after the conclusion of the agreement,
but only on the condition that the American side “does not incur any costs in
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 303
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
this regard”.51 This means that the Slovak Republic will be obliged to pay for the
valuation of real estate built and used by the American side, but the American
side will not be obliged to compensate for damage or wear and tear to real
estate owned by the Slovak Republic that is built on the land in the agreed
facilities and premises. US title to chattels remains.
Article 6 transfers to the Slovak Republic “direct responsibility ” for the security
of the US Armed Forces during their stay on the territory of the Slovak Republic
and at the same time allows the American side to establish on its territory,
reading between the lines, essentially military police, claiming that the Slovak
Republic “entitles the US Armed Forces to the exercise of all rights and
administration necessary for the provision, use, operation, defense and control...
including the adoption of such appropriate measures for the preservation or
restoration of order and protection ...”.52 The question arises how the Slovak
Republic should practically ensure this security, if it has given up the right to
enter the objects and the right to control the means of transport of the
American side!
This means that after the ratication of the DCA, the Slovak Republic will no
longer be able to properly fulll its obligations in the area of responsibility for
security on its territory, because it will not have sucient information about
who is entering its territory, who is on its territory, what military installations,
weapons and material are located on its territory or transported through its
territory. Here we note again that taking measures to defend maintain or
restore order in a sovereign democratic and legal state cannot be entrusted to
a foreign state. And not only that, the activity of Slovak state´s authorities
cannot be conditioned by coordination with a foreign state. It should be
emphasized again; this is a bilateral agreement with a foreign state, not a
multilateral agreement on collective security concluded according to Article 7
paragraph 3 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic!
By Article 7, Slovakia waives the right to countersign American orders regarding
transfers from abroad to the territory of Slovakia and vice versa! It means that
the US Army will have the right to reassign or remove any of its units or
members of its Armed Forces to or from the territory of Slovakia, and the Slovak
51 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 5.
52 Ibidem, Article 6.
304 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
side will not be able to prevent such reassignment or placement. On the basis
of this same article, not only soldiers, but also their family members and
contractors will not be subject to the visa obligation, residence registration
and control of foreigners on the territory of Slovakia53. The Slovak Republic will
not have the opportunity to nd out who is moving freely and without
restrictions on its territory! And whether, according to international law, there
are no illegally detained persons in the premises of the bases.
It is clear from the above that the Slovak Republic will not have a regular, or no
control over who enters its territory and who is on its territory, and whether
these persons enjoy in the Slovak Republic the basic human rights and
freedoms guaranteed by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic even to
foreigners.54 By accepting such legislation, the Slovak Republic renounces the
guarantee of basic human rights and freedoms on its territory. This article
refers also, among other things, to the NATO SOFA treaty. Such wording leads
to the interpretation that it is a transfer of members of the armed forces of the
North Atlantic Treaty, but this is not the case. This agreement applies only to
the bilateral legal relations of the Slovak Republic and the United States of
America - outside the framework of NATO, i.e. outside the fulllment of tasks
according to the NATO SOFA agreement.
In Article 8, Slovakia undertakes to provide logistical support to the US military, in
Articles 9 and 10 it recognizes the American registration of motor vehicles, as
well as the validity of driver’s licenses issued in the USA even for family
members and contractors without requiring a driving test, and it waives the
right to require certicates and licenses to perform profession. In this context,
it may be noted that free license plates or other benets for private motor
vehicles of members of the US Armed Forces, US contractors and dependents
do not respect Article 20 paragraph 1 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic,
according to which the property rights of all owners have the same legal
content and protection. In addition, binding guidelines for the procedure of
the Military Police of the Slovak Republic in the performance of its tasks by
procedures agreed with the authority of a foreign state - outside the
framework established for state authorities by the diction of Article 2
paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic - limits the sovereignty
of the Slovak Republic.
53 Idem, Article 7.
54 Article 52 paragraph 2 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 305
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
By Article 11, the Slovak Republic allows the American side free movement of
all its vessels, aircraft and motor vehicles without the possibility of their
inspection and search, and that is free of charge. Essentially, this means that,
for example, planes will be able to land, take o and refuel anytime and
anywhere at state-owned or state-operated airports without paying navigation
and other fees. The same applies to vessels. Motor vehicles will not be able to
be controlled; the Slovak side will not know what is being transported in them
freely without restrictions on its territory.55 The free movement of aircraft,
vessels and vehicles tied up by the armed forces of the USA or exclusively for
the USA and the ban on the search of these vehicles without the consent of the
USA56 violates the sovereignty and sovereignty of the Slovak Republic and
grossly interferes with the activities of the state bodies of the Slovak Republic,
which without consent of the US, they will not be able to fulll their obligations
(for example, law enforcement agencies). At the same time, the Slovak Republic
will bear responsibility if there is a violation of its obligations regarding the
handling of military material, the transport of weapons and dangerous
materials. The right to y over, refuel in ight, land and take o on the territory
of the Slovak Republic without any consent in a specic matter essentially
means that the territory of the Slovak Republic also becomes the territory of
the USA (but the reverse is not true, meaning that the Slovak Republic could
also consider the territory of the USA as its own). Exemption from fees for
navigation services, including track fees and terminal fees, only conrms the
one-sided advantage of this treaty for the US.
We come to the most controversial articles of the entire agreement, which will
essentially turn Slovakia into Japan’s Okinawa. Article 12 includes a clause on
the basis of which Slovakia waives criminal jurisdiction. Article 12 par. 1 of the
DCA proposal literally says that “...based on the request of the US...the Slovak
Republic, within its sovereign authority, hereby waives its primary criminal
jurisdiction...”.57 This article, as Fábry argues, is a problem and will create a
serious precedent,58 because the Slovak government must act on the basis of
55 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 11.
56 Ibidem, Article 11, point 1.
57 Idem, Article 12.
58 FáBry, Branislav, Ústava, suverenita a dohoda o obrannej spolupráci sUSA, 2019.
306 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
the constitution,59 and if it wants to give up its sovereign rights, there must be
a constitutional basis for it. And although DCA allows this relinquishment of
jurisdiction to be appealed in writing within 21 days of the notication, if “he
special interest of the Slovak Republic is aected”, it is a relinquishment of a
larger range of rights, which former American colonies have relinquished. Also
unacceptable is the provision of Article 12 para. 2, on the basis of which the
American authorities would not even have to inform the Slovak side about less
serious crimes committed by members of the US army on the territory of the
Slovak Republic! According to paragraph 4, American soldiers and their family
members cannot be “...tried in absentia without their consent” in Slovakia.60
This is basically an insurance policy of the American army, known from the
American bases in Japan, which basically means that if an American soldier
shoots a Japanese man or rapes a Japanese woman, he is transferred from
Japan to another base abroad by the American command, and that is the
whole case actually obliterated because the Japanese authorities cannot try a
soldier in absentia unless he gives them permission to do so. And in Article 7 of
the DCA, the Slovak side waived the right to countersign orders for reassignment
and in subsequent articles also to control the means of transport and objects
used by the American side! This means that in the case of a crime committed
by an American soldier on the territory of Slovakia, the Slovak authorities will
not be able to prevent this person from leaving the territory of the Slovak
Republic; they will never know where this person is and when he left the
territory of Slovakia. Thus, such a case will never be closed.
As stated by the Prosecutor General of the Slovak Republic, the Slovak Republic
cannot transfer its criminal powers to a foreign state, or waive them, except in
cases covered by Art. 7 paragraph 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution of the
Slovak Republic:
– according to article 7 par. 1 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (on
the basis of a free decision to enter into a state union with other states,
namely by a constitutional law that will be conrmed by a referendum),
59 Svák, Ján, et al., Ústavné právo Slovenskej republiky.
60 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 12.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 307
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
– according to article 7 par. 2 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (to
the European Union, namely by an international treaty ratied and declared
in the manner established by law or on the basis of such a treaty),
– according to article 7 par. 3 of the Constitution of the Slovak Republic (by
joining the organization of mutual collective security, for example NATO).61
Article 13 of the DCA applies to the arrest, detention, detention, and
imprisonment of members of the US Armed Forces and their dependents.
According to this, Slovak authorities guarantee to immediately inform the
authorities of the US armed forces about the arrest or detention of a member of
the US armed forces or a dependent person by the Slovak authorities, the
authorities of the US armed forces, in coordination with the Slovak authorities,
will have immediate access to any such person whenever they request it, US
armed forces may be present at all proceedings, including interrogations of
such a member or dependent by Slovak authorities, A member of the US
Armed Forces or a dependent who is being investigated by the Slovak
authorities or is subject to legal proceedings shall remain or be placed under
the control of the US Armed Forces authorities, if requested by those authorities,
until the completion of all related legal proceedings (including appeal
proceedings ), in such cases, the authorities of the US armed forces will ensure
that a member of the armed forces participates in these proceedings and will
make every eort to ensure the presence of a member of the civilian component
or a dependent person before the Slovak authorities in the proceedings that
may require the presence of this person, in the event that the Slovak court
proceedings are not concluded within one year of their initiation, the obligation
of the authorities of the US armed forces ceases (is this the obligation to place
under control, ensure participation or presence? - the text is unclear), at the
request of the Slovak authorities, this period may be extended according to
the agreement between the authorities of the US armed forces and the relevant
Slovak authorities; the US Armed Forces will consider the request with
understanding, the period of restriction of personal freedom by the Slovak
authorities or the period of detention by the authorities of the US armed forces
shall be included in the prison sentence, if it is imposed in the matter in
question, in the event that both contracting parties do not agree otherwise,
the deprivation of liberty imposed by a Slovak court on a member of the US
armed forces or a dependent person shall be carried out in one or more Slovak
61 Žilinka, Maroš, PLNÉ ZNENIE PREJAVU M.ŽILINKU…, cit.
308 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
correctional facilities designated by the contracting parties for these purposes,
the Slovak authorities will allow the US Armed Forces to visit these persons
outside of normal visiting hours and will allow them to provide assistance to
these persons, including care for the health, welfare and morale in the form of
clothing, food, bedding, medical and dental care and religious counseling,
Slovak authorities will allow family members to visit these persons during
normal visiting hours and, depending on a special arrangement, will also allow
them to provide assistance to these persons, including care for their health,
well-being and morals in the form of clothing, food, bed linen, medical and
dental care and religious counseling.62 What can be added to such a
formulation? Without any reasonable justication, it accords to prosecuted
and convicted members of the US armed forces and their dependents
privileges that other criminals do not have. And not only that. It intervenes in
the activities of Slovak state authorities and instructs them on how to proceed
in the event of the arrest, detention, detention or imprisonment of members
of the US armed forces and their dependents.
Also unacceptable for the sovereignty of Slovakia is Article 14, which states
that “[A]gencies of the US Armed Forces are responsible for maintaining
discipline... and may establish military police units. The US Armed Forces, in
cooperation with the authorities of the Slovak Republic, can use these units
in villages adjacent to military facilities and areas where the US Armed Forces
are located”.63
The exercise of military police authority by the US armed forces on the territory
of the Slovak Republic, even in communities outside military facilities and
premises, is a gross and unjustiable interference with the sovereignty of the
Slovak Republic. Such a wording is a precedent, because the intervention of
the US authorities in Slovak municipalities is absolutely unacceptable, and the
same applies to the implementation of disciplinary measures, the observance of
the prohibition of torture or the understanding of human dignity.
According to Article 15, the Slovak Republic should also give up its civil and
administrative jurisdiction, which would absolve the American side from
responsibility not only for administrative oenses committed on the territory
62 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 13.
63 Ibidem, Article 14.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 309
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
of the Slovak Republic, but also from civil liability for damage caused by
members of the American army, including their civilian component, during
their activities caused. Moreover, paragraph 3 of this article states that “[F]or the
determination of the fact whether any civil liability/responsibility has arisen
from the actions or omissions of the US Armed Forces, including the civilian
component, in the performance of its ocial duties, the conclusive evidence
of this fact is the conrmation by the appropriate by the authorities of the US
Armed Forces on the territory of the Slovak Republic”. That is, the US Armed
Forces themselves will decide whether the US Armed Forces have caused
damage to someone, and it will not help even if a hundred witnesses conrm
that the American vehicle really polluted the land or damaged someone’s
fence. This is a unilateral favoring of members of the US armed forces, including
the civilian component. Such legislation creates room for subjectivism and
voluntarism. Liability for damage in civil or administrative proceedings can
simply be excluded by issuing a certicate that the damage occurred in the
performance of ocial duties. And who will bear responsibility for the damage
caused by members of the armed forces, including the civilian component, in
the performance of ocial duties, this agreement does not regulate at all. So,
this legislation essentially establishes the substantive and procedural
exemption of members of the US armed forces, including the civilian
component, from liability for damage.
Disrespect for one’s own state sovereignty is also contained in Article 15,
paragraph 4 DCA, which states that members of the U.S. Armed Forces,
including the civilian component, will not be subject to default judgment or
actions prejudicial to their interests if duty or duly authorized absence
temporarily prevents them from participating in civil proceedings. Such
proceeding is also unilateral; protects members of the US Armed Forces,
including the civilian component, from liability for damages without any
reasonable cause. It is sucient to prove, even repeatedly, that the defendant’s
participation in the civil proceedings before the court was prevented by ocial
duties or approved absence. This can lead to unnecessary delays in proceedings
and, ultimately, to the impossibility of inferring responsibility for illegal actions and
the obligation to compensate for damage that did not arise even in connection
with the performance of ocial duties.64
64 Brhlíková, Radoslava, Bilaterálne dohody o obrannej spolupráci - dohoda medzi Slovenskom
a USA: Bilateral agreements on defence cooperation - agreement between Slovakia and the
USA, 2022; Žilinka, Maroš, PLNÉ ZNENIE PREJAVU M.ŽILINKU…, cit.
310 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
In Articles 16 and 17, at the request of the American side, Slovakia exempts
American soldiers, their family members, civilian partners, and the American
army from paying VAT for goods, services and materials purchased on the
territory of Slovakia, if the goods and services directly serve the American
army, but also private purposes. This mainly concerns construction services,
suppliers of construction materials, fuels and such services for soldiers as, for
example, contracts for the provision of mobile services. Article 17 explicitly
states that American soldiers will not pay any taxes, VAT fees and any other
payments related to the mandatory payments required from citizens of the
Slovak Republic. According to articles 18 to 20, members of the US military will
be able to import or export anything in their possession from the territory of
Slovakia without any import and export duties and fees. Regarding import and
export for ocial purposes, instead of customs control of goods imported and
exported by the US armed forces or for the US armed forces, the Slovak
authorities will only have to accept the presentation of a certicate65. According
to Article 21, the American side will even be allowed to open its own shops and
recreational facilities under the jurisdiction of American law, while the Slovak
Republic “... will not require any licenses, permits, inspections or other
regulatory control of the performance of these activities...”.66 According to
Article 22 of this agreement, the United States of America will be authorized to
establish, maintain and operate military postal oces on the territory of the
Slovak Republic for the purpose of collecting, transporting and delivering
postal items and providing related postal services for the US armed forces,
dependents and suppliers of the US. US postage stamps may be used on items
sent from these post oces. Ocial shipments of the U.S. Armed Forces will be
exempt from inspection, search, or seizure.67 According to Article 23 of DCA
the armed forces of the United States shall have the right to import, export and
use the currency of the United States or nancial instruments denominated in
the name of the United States of America in any amount. The U.S. Armed Forces
will be authorized to distribute or exchange to members of the U.S. Armed
Forces and dependents currency and instruments denominated in the currency
valid in the U.S., the Slovak Republic, or any other country. Members of the
US armed forces and dependents will be authorized to import and export US
currency and instruments denominated in the US currency and to export from
65 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 18.
66 Ibidem, Article 21.
67 Idem, Article 22.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 311
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
the territory of the Slovak Republic any currency and instruments denominated
in any currency, if they were imported into the territory of the Slovak Republic
or received from the US armed forces.68 Such legislation will cause unsolvable
situations in application practice in the area of paying taxes, fees, levies and
insurance premiums. In addition, it will deform the business environment in
the Slovak Republic.
According to Article 24 of this Agreement, the U.S. Armed Forces and
organizations performing military service activities referred to in Articles 21
and 22 shall be authorized to employ dependents as well as local civilian
employees. Dependents will not be required to have a work permit. Conditions
of employment shall be established by the U.S. Armed Forces and relevant
organizations in accordance with applicable U.S. laws and regulations. Wages
and salaries, benets, supplemental payments, and increases in such payments
shall be in accordance with U.S. laws and regulations. Wages for local civilian
employees shall be determined taking into account on the employee’s tax
obligations, as well as employee contributions, including social and health
insurance.69 However, the employment of local civilian employees by the US
Armed Forces does not impose any obligations on the US Armed Forces under
Slovak law. Who will pay the employer’s insurance rates for the employee?
Pursuant to Article 25 of this Agreement, the U.S. Armed Forces shall be
authorized to contract for the supply of any material, supplies, equipment, and
services (including construction), without limitation in the selection of the
contractor, supplier, or person providing such material, supplies, equipment,
or services. These contracts will be governed by US regulations. And according
to Article 26 of this agreement, US suppliers will not be subject to laws
regarding: the conditions of their employment for the performance of work
under contracts with the US Armed Forces, the granting of licenses and
registration of business entities exclusively in connection with the provision of
goods and services to the US Armed Forces in the territory Slovakia. Such U.S.
suppliers will be exempt from all taxes, including corporate income tax, excise
taxes, and value added tax, arising from the supply of goods or services to the
U.S. Armed Forces or from the construction of facilities for the U.S. Armed
Forces. And they will also not be subject to any type of income or prot tax
from the Slovak Republic or its territorial units on the part of their income or
68 Idem, Article 23.
69 Idem, Article 24.
312 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
prot that derives from the contract or subcontract with the US Armed Forces.
Such formulation does not respect the constitutional principle of equality and
grossly disrupts the business environment in the Slovak Republic.
An example of disrespect for one’s own statehood is shown in Article 27 of the
proposal, which states that “... (SR) conrms its policy to implement the relevant
laws, regulations and standards regarding the protection of the environment,
safety and health with adequate regard for the health and safety of the Armed
Forces USA...”. This means that the Slovak Republic undertakes to adopt new
laws according to the needs of the US Army, while it is not clear which specic laws
will need to be changed. And this commitment also raises other questions,
such as whether the Slovak Republic will be obliged to reduce the level of
nature protection in the area near the airport in order to increase the safety
of US soldiers. Or how Slovakia will deal with it if it violates European Union
legislation in this regard and will be sued by the Commission or its own
authorities or citizens at the European Court of Justice. Together with Branislav
Fábry, we ask why the laws of the Slovak Republic should be prepared according
to the needs of the US military. Shouldn’t it be the other way around that we
condition agreements with the US on compliance with our laws?70
The part of this article concerning the obligations in the management of
hazardous waste is also problematic. All obligations arising from the Basel
Convention on the Management of Movements of Hazardous Wastes Across
State Borders and Their Disposal (promulgated in the Collection of Laws under
No. 60/1995 Coll.) must be fullled by the Slovak Republic, without being able
to inuence the origin, quantity and the danger of this waste for the
environment, public health and safety. The US Armed Forces undertake only to
provide the information necessary for the Slovak Republic to fulll these
obligations.
Article 28 of the DCA applies to public services and communications. According
to it, the U.S. armed forces and U.S. contractors will be able to use water, electricity
and other public services based on contractual conditions, including rates or
fees that are no less favorable than those available to the armed forces of the
Slovak Republic or the Slovak Republic under similar circumstances, free of taxes
or other government charges - the cost to the US Armed Forces will be equal to
70 FáBry, Branislav, Ústava, suverenita a dohoda o obrannej spolupráci sUSA, cit.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 313
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
their proportionate share of the use of these public services.71 Personal use of
municipal waste management services by members of the US Armed Forces,
their dependents and US contractors will be subject to fees.72 The US military
will use the radio spectrum; the United States shall be entitled to operate its
own telecommunications systems (this right shall include the right to use such
facilities and services as are necessary to guarantee the full ability to operate
telecommunications systems and the right to use the radio spectrum necessary
for this purpose in accordance with the coordination requirements set forth in
of point 4 of this article, which governs the forward deployment of defense
equipment, supplies, and material.73 The use of the radio spectrum shall be free
of charge to the United States.74 In order to avoid mutual interference, the US
armed forces will be obliged to make all reasonable eorts to coordinate the
use of the radio spectrum with the relevant Slovak authorities, while committing
to take into account the national frequency spectrum table.75 In the case that
the equipment of the US armed forces or US suppliers causes harmful
interference during the operation of the equipment on the territory of the
Slovak Republic, the US armed forces and the Slovak authorities will promptly
consult with the aim of mitigating such interference, taking into account
operational aspects.76
In this case too, it is a serious interference with the sovereign rights of the
Slovak Republic in the eld of radio spectrum use. The radio spectrum is a key
public resource for the transmission of information in important areas, for
example in communication via satellite systems, in transport (including
aviation), in radio and television broadcasting, in various other public and
private communication systems, as well as in short-range devices such as are
medical devices, alarms, weather stations, etc. Radio frequencies are a limited
resource, while they are necessary for the functioning of many things, for
example, mobile phones, the Internet, remote controlled devices. According
to this agreement, in the event that equipment of the US armed forces or US
71 Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States of
America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, Article 28, point 1.
72 Ibidem, Article 28 point 2.
73 Idem, Article 28, point 3.
74 Idem, Article 28, point 3, last sentence.
75 Idem, Article 28, point 4.
76 Idem, Article 28, point 5.
314 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
suppliers interferes with the operation of equipment on the territory of the
Slovak Republic, they will not have to remove the interference - it is enough if
they consult with the Slovak authorities with the aim of mitigating such
interference, i.e. not eliminating the interference. And it’s not just disruptive
inuences. The radio frequency spectrum in the European Union is regulated.
It cannot be ruled out that the US armed forces will use the radio frequency
spectrum at the expense of the Slovak Republic, which must comply with its
international obligations.77
According to Article 29 point 1; all activities under this agreement are subject
to the availability of resources and funds allocated for these purposes. Such a
declaration is unclear. It would be appropriate to request an explanation of
which contracting party allocated, and to what extent, the resources and funds
for the activities under this agreement. And what about providing the sum of
100 million dollars for the repair of military airports as promised by the
American side? Will these funds be provided to the Slovak Republic and under
what conditions? There is not a word about it in DCA. The USA does not have
to conclude any other agreement on this issue; nothing obliges them to do so.
As it is with nancing in reality, it was already mentioned above in the text.
Article 29 point 2 resolves the issue of disputes between the contracting
parties. These will be dealt with at the lowest possible level and, if necessary,
will be referred to the executive representatives, i.e. the Ministries of Defense, for
consideration and resolution, and if they cannot be resolved at this level, they
will be referred to the contracting parties for consultation and resolution. This
point is followed by point 3, according to which disputes and other issues that
are subject to consultation shall not be submitted to any international court,
tribunal or similar body, or to any other third party. This means that none of the
disputes between the contracting parties subject to consultation cannot be
submitted for decision to any independent court or arbitration body.
The Slovak Republic on the basis of DCA, under the conditions specied in this
agreement in particular:
– cedes its territory to a foreign state for military purposes, outside the
framework of collective defense through the North Atlantic Treaty,
77 Brhlíková, Radoslava, Bilaterálne dohody o obrannej spolupráci - dohoda medzi Slovenskom
a USA: Bilateral agreements on defence cooperation - agreement between Slovakia and the
USA, cit.; Žilinka, Maroš, PLNÉ ZNENIE PREJAVU M.ŽILINKU: Poslanci mu neumožnili vystúpiť
v NRSR. 2022.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 315
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
– during the entire period of validity of this agreement, it will lose complete
control over part of its territory, not only over Malacky-Kuchyňa Military
Airport and Sliač Military Airport,
– will have to allow access and use of land and facilities (including roads, ports
and airports) owned by the state, self-governing regions and municipalities,
as well as privately owned by the US armed forces and their suppliers, for an
unlimited period of time and without compensation,
– will not have proper control over who enters its territory and who is on its
territory,
– resigns from guaranteeing the protection of basic human rights and
freedoms granted by the Constitution of the Slovak Republic to
foreigners as well,
– waives its criminal jurisdiction,
– grant to members of the US Armed Forces and dependents who are arrested,
detained, in custody or serving a prison sentence such privileges that other
perpetrators of criminal oenses are not granted by our legal system,
– will enable the exercise of the authority of the military police of the US
armed forces on the territory of the Slovak Republic, even in communities
outside military facilities and premises,
– will allow the US Armed Forces and organizations performing military
service activities to employ dependents as well as local civilian employees
(dependents will not be required to have a work permit); in the area of labor
law, it will enable the application of US laws and regulations in our territory,
– will enable exemption from paying taxes, duties, fees and insurance
premiums, even in cases where such exemption will distort the business
environment,
– must fulll the obligations arising from the Basel Convention on the
Management of Movements of Hazardous Wastes across State Borders
and their Disposal, without being able to inuence the generation,
quantity and danger of this waste for the environment, public health
and safety,
316 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
– must recognize the substantive and procedural exemption of members of
the US armed forces, including the civilian component, from liability for da-
mage in civil or administrative proceedings,
– it will lose many of its sovereign rights in areas in which it transfers part of
the exercise of its rights to the US or the US armed forces.
What can be more indicative of the threat of losing one’s statehood and
sovereignty than such agreement?
5. CONCLUSION
Result: DCA between the USA and the Slovak republic means the completion
of the European encirclement of Russia. By it the USA tries to hold back and
provoke a conict with Russia on European soil. With it, the USA is creating a
frontier for the protection of its own hegemonic position, unilateralism and
territory, the so-called an eye that will attract a possible attack. This means that
in a possible conict with Russia and China, Bratislava will be bombed instead
of Washington, Warsaw instead of New York, and Bucharest instead of another
American city.
Picture 1: Necklace of US military bases around the neck of Russia.
The Slovak Republic has experience with the occupation of foreign troops on
its territory. It were the troops of the Warsaw Pac t who had a temporary stay
on its territory based on the Treaty between the government of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the government of the Union of Soviet
Socialist Republics on the conditions for the temporary stay of Soviet troops
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 317
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic, which entered into
force on October 18, 196878. In this treaty, it was explicitly stated that the
temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic would not violate its sovereignty and that Soviet troops would
not interfere in the internal aairs of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic,
that Soviet troops, persons belonging to them and members of the families
of these persons located on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
will preserve the legal order valid in the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic79 and
that in the case of crimes and misdemeanors committed on the territory of the
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic by persons belonging to the Soviet troops or
members of their families, the Czechoslovak law and the Czechoslovak courts,
the prosecutor's oce and other authorities responsible for the prosecution of
criminal oenses operate and that crimes committed by Soviet soldiers are
investigated by the military prosecutor's oce and heard by the military justice
authorities of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.80 The exceptions applied to
cases in which persons belonging to the Soviet troops or members of their
families committed crimes or misdemeanors only against the Soviet Union or
to persons belonging to the Soviet troops or members of their families and to
cases in which persons belonging to the Soviet troops committed criminal acts
or misdemeanors during the performance of ocial duties in the premises of
permanent garrisons of military units.81 This legal regulation was undoubtedly
more advantageous for the Slovak Republic than the one coming out from the
DCA with the USA. According to the General Prosecutor of the Slovak republic
it is a paradox that needs to be seriously thought about. No occupation treaty
can be more benecial to the state than a treaty that has in its title and in the
preamble that it is a defense treaty.82
78 Collection of laws No. 11/1969 Coll.
79 Article 2, Treaty between the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic and the
government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the conditions for the temporary
stay of Soviet troops on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
80 Article 9, paragraph 1, Treaty between the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the conditions for
the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic.
81 Article 9 par. 2 letters a) and b), Treaty between the government of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic and the government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on the conditions for
the temporary stay of Soviet troops on the territory of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic
82 Žilinka, Maroš, 2022.
318 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
The Slovak Republic also has experience with the presence of the troops of the
member states of the North Atlantic Treaty on its territory based on the Treaty
between the states that are parties to the North Atlantic Treaty, relating to the
status of their armed forces; this contract entered into force for the Slovak
Republic on October 13, 2004 and it was published in the Collection of Laws
under No. 566/2004 Coll. This legal arrangement is also more advantageous for
the Slovak Republic than the one coming out from the DCA with the USA.
Moreover, the Slovak Republic is a member state of the North Atlantic Treaty.
This does not apply to the United States of America; the Slovak Republic is not
a member state. But the DCA with the USA makes of Slovakia a vassal territory,
or even more explicitly the European Puerto Rico.
The assumption that the agreement with the USA is a vassal agreement rather
than an agreement between two equal partners was conrmed. The treaty
signicantly limits the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic, which contradicts
Article 1, paragraph 1 of the Constitution, which states that “The Slovak
Republic is a sovereign, democratic and legal state”. And therefore, in this case,
the Slovak authorities should follow Article 2, paragraph 2 of the Constitution
which states: “State authorities can act only on the basis of the constitution,
within its limits and to the extent and in the manner established by law”.83 This
means that the relevant ministry should not negotiate an agreement that
contradicts the constitution, and conversely, it should not have any mandate
to negotiate an unconstitutional agreement. Professor Mráz also conrmed
this in an interview for RTVS News and Comments when he said that “...if
infrastructure for the American army starts to be built here (at our air bases), in
that case it could be a loss of sovereignty... military equipment is always subject
to the legal order of the state whose sovereign insignia it bears” and he
expressed the opinion that it would not be good if “...our airelds on Sliač and
in Kuchyňa end up like Ramstein in Germany”.84
The DCA does not create mutual cooperation between military of host country
and the US military. It constitutes an interference with state sovereigns and
threatens peace in Europe. In fact, Slovakia does not need DCA for its defense,
because membership in NATO should provide it with sucient guarantees, as
politicians convince citizens. But with DCA, NATO loses its justication and has
become just an appendage of US foreign policy. DCA does not bring anything
new or good to Slovakia, just radicalization of the domestic political scene.
83 Constitution of the Slovak Republic.
84 Mráz, Správy a komentáre, 19. 3. 2019, 22.00 h.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 319
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
More than 51% of Slovak citizens are against this treaty, which rudely trampled
on the legacy of November 89 and killed security guarantees in Europe. In fact,
this agreement represents a threat to Slovakia, it increases the need to invest
in defense and at the same time makes Slovakia a target whereas the nowadays
Europe is walking blindly towards war under the leadership of the USA.85
From this analysis, it can be clearly concluded that this agreement signicantly
interferes with the rights and violates the sovereignty of the Slovak Republic. It
is a signicantly asymmetric agreement, benecial to the interests and needs
of the stronger party. So this is an example of a vassal agreement that favors
one party over another, limiting the sovereignty of one party without
compensation. From Kinne's analysis of DCAs in the world, it can be deduced
that, in general, DCAs are symmetrical, they speak of cooperation between
two equal partners in dierent areas of security policy without the requirement
to deploy military units on the partner's territory. Typical DCAs say nothing
about the deployment of foreign troops on the territory of a sovereign state.
And as we have illustrated with the example of DCA between France and India,
no other country, except the USA, imposes the presence of its troops on its
territory on its partners. None of them talks about limiting the sovereignty of
the partner in the way and to the extent that it is in the case of the DCA oered
by the USA to Eastern European countries. Even the promise of nancial
investment can in no way balance and outweigh the inviolability of state
sovereignty. No proud state will accept such a gift.
In general, the opening of the issue of the deployment of foreign military units
on the territory of Slovakia is an extremely sensitive, even blatant and arrogant
issue. It is a denial of the message of November 1989, which established the
departure of foreign troops from the territory of the Czechoslovak Republic as
one of the requirements for the revival of society.
BIBLIOGRAPHY
Agreement between the Government of the French Republic and the Government
of the Republic of India on Defence Cooperation, signed 20 February 2006
[online], New Delhi. [cit.05.05.2020], Available from: <https://www.google.
com/url?sa=t&rct=j&q=&esrc=s&source=web&cd=1&cad=rja&uact=8&-
ved=2ahUKEwi10oSkjMfnAhUXQkEAHev2DvAQFjAAegQIBBAB&url=ht-
tps%3A%2F%2Fin.ambafrance.org%2FAgreement-between-France-and-In-
dia&usg=AOvVaw3kW0inclUWdABXLHf_ZauM>
85 Brhlíková, Radoslava, “Hľadanie tváre zahraničnej politiky Slovenska po roku 1989”, cit.
320 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Governments of the United States
of America and the Government of the Slovak Republic, 10.8.2022 [online]
[09.05.2024], Available from: https://www.mzv.sk/diplomacia/bezpecnost-
na-politika/obranna-dohoda-s-usa
Agreement on Defense Cooperation between the Government of the United Sta-
tes of America and the Government of the Republic of Estonia, Tallin,
January 17, 2017 [online], In: Treaties and Other International Acts Series,
17-706.1 [09.05.2024], Available from: https://www.state.gov/wp-content/
uploads/2020/04/17-706.1-Estonia-Defense-TIMS-56237.pdf
Bodin, J., Six books of the Commonwealth [online] 1576, In: York University [09.05.2024],
Available from: http://www.yorku.ca/comninel/courses/3020pdf/
six_books.pdf
Brhlíková, R., “Bezpečnosť ako národnoštátny záujem v kontexte členstva v Európskej
únii” [Security as Nation-state interest in the context of EU membership], In:
Poláčková, Z. & Brhlíková, R. (eds.), Národnoštátne záujmy v postintegračnom
období [Nation-state interests in post integration era] Nitra, UKF, 2017, ISBN
978-80-558-1246-5, pp. 69-94.
Brhlíková, R. (2022), “Bilaterálne dohody o obrannej spolupráci - dohoda medzi Slo-
venskom a USA: Bilateral agreements on defence cooperation - agreement
between Slovakia and the USA”, In: Studia Politica Slovaca, Roč. 13, č. 2 (2020),
pp. 4-18, DOI 10.31577/SPS.2020-2.1, ISSN 1337-8163.
Brhlíková, R., “Hľadanie tváre zahraničnej politiky Slovenska po roku 1989” [Searching
for the face of Slovakia’s foreign policy after 1989], In: Radoslava Brhlíková
(ed.), Identita, menšiny a zahraničná politika na Slovensku po roku 1989/ Iden-
tity, minorities and foreign policy in Slovakia after 1989; VEDA, Bratislava, 2023,
ISBN 978-80-224-2021-1, pp. 62-114.
Department of Defense, Fact Sheet on Section 2808 Funding Pool [online] In DOD 15.
2. 2019, 21 pp. [09.05.2024], Available from: https://www.reed.senate.gov/
imo/media/doc/Milcon%20Wall%20Project.pdf?fbclid=IwAR31y0zeUmCa-
Z84ayMTjjQ9z8ACvSp0UhhNTy19sCjqtVkSIfenFPh1olsY
FáBry, B., Ústava, suverenita a dohoda o obrannej spolupráci s USA [Constitution, so-
vereignity and defence cooperation agreement with the USA] [online], In:
BlogPravda.sk 12.5.2019 [09.05.2024], Available from: https://brankof.blog.
pravda.sk/2019/05/12/ustava-suverenita-a-dohoda-o-obrannej-spolu-
praci-s-usa/
Fearon, J. D. (1998): “Bargaining, Enforcement, and International Cooperation”, In: In-
ternational Organization, Vol. 52, No. 2, pp. 269-305.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 321
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
grieco, J. R. Powell& D. Snidal, “The Relative-Gains Problem for International Coopera-
tion”, In: American Political Science Review, Vol. 87, No. 3, 1993, pp. 729-743.
inSinna V., “US Air Force tests ‘base in a box’ in Poland to prep for future wars” [onli-
ne], In: DefenseNews, 27.8.2018 [09.05.2024], Available from: https://www.
defensenews.com/air/2018/08/27/us-air-force-tests-base-in-a-box-in-po-
land-to-prep-for-future-wars/
jung, D. F., & D. A. lake, “Markets, Hierarchies, and Networks: An Agent-Based Organi-
zational Ecology”, In: American Journal of Political Science, Vol. 55, No. 4, 2011,
pp. 972-990.
kinne, B. J., “Defense Cooperation Agreements and the Emergence of a Global Se-
curity Network” [online], International Organization, Vol. 72, Issue 4, 2018,
pp. 799-837, Cambridge University Press: 15 August 2018. DOI: https://doi.
org/10.1017/S0020818318000218. [09.05.2024]. Available from: https://
www.cambridge.org/core/journals/international-organization/article/de-
fense-cooperation-agreements-and-the-emergence-of-a-global-securi-
ty-network/76662383DB9CA3D26BE4FA883E5C95A2/core-reader
krejčí, O., Mezinárodní politika [International Politics] Ekopress, Praha, 2001, 744 pp.,
ISBN 978-80-87865-07-1.
kydd, A. H., Trust and Mistrust in International Relations, Princeton University Press,
Princeton, NJ, 2005.
LIPSON, CH., “International Cooperation in Economic and Security Aairs”, In: World
Politics, Vol. 37, No. 1, 1984, pp. 1-23.
LONG, A. G. (2003) Defense Pacts and International Trade. In: Journal of Peace Re-
search, Vol. 40 (5), s. 537–52.
MiniSterStvo oBrany (2019), Ministerstvo obrany ukončilo rokovania o peniazoch z
USA... [The Ministry of Defense has ended negotiations on money from
the US…] [online]. In: www.mod.gov.sk. Was available on 07.02.2020 from:
https://www.mod.gov.sk/43778-sk/ministerstvo-obrany-ukoncilo-rokova-
nia-o-peniazoch-z-usa-pretoze-ich-prijatie-by-ohrozilo-suverenitu-slovens-
kej-republiky/
Matz-lück, N., “Framework Agreements”, In: R. Wolfrum (ed.), Max Planck Encyclopedia
of Public International Law, Vol. 4, 2012, pp. 220-224, Oxford University Press,
Oxford [online] [09.05.2024], Available from:www.mpepil.com
Mráz, S., Správy a komentáre, RTVS Správy a komentáre, 2019) [Interview: News and
comments] [online], In: RTVS, 19.3.2019, 22.00 h. [09.05.2024], Available
from: http://www.rtvs.sk/televizia/archiv/14040/182875
322 ISSN EDICIÓN IMPRESA: 0864165X, ISSN EDICIÓN ELECTRÓNICA: 27886670, VOL. 05, NO. 02, JULIODICIEMBRE, 2025
Dra. Radoslava Brhlíková
Mráz, S., F. Poredoš & P. vršanSký, Medzinárodné právo verejné, [International Public
Law], Bratislava, 2003, PraF., UK, ISBN 80-7160-175-6.
Morrow, J. D., “Modeling the Forms of International Cooperation: Distribution versus
Information”, In: International Organization, Vol. 48, No. 3, 1994, pp. 387-87.
newMan, M. E. J., “The Structure and Function of Complex Networks”, In: SIAM Review,
Vol. 45, No. 2, 2003, pp. 167-256.
Potočný, M. & J. ondřej, Mezinárodní právo veřejné, 4. Doplnené a rozšířené vydáni [In-
ternational Public Law. 4th Completed and expanded editions], C. H. Beck,
Praha, 2003, ISBN 80-7179-801-0.
Sandler, T., “ The Economic Theory of Alliances: A Survey”, In: Journal of Conict Resolu-
tion, Vol. 37, No. 3, 1993, pp. 446-483.
Snidal, D., “Coordination versus Prisoners’ Dilemma: Implications for International
Cooperation and Regimes”, In: The American Political Science Review, Vol. 79,
No. 4, 1985, pp. 923-942.
Svák, J., et al., Ústavné právo Slovenskej republiky - Osobitná časť a Všeobecná časť [Cons-
titutional law of the Slovak Republic - Special part and General part], Eu-
rokódex, 2013, ISBN 978-80-8155-005-8.
The Defense and Economic Cooperation Agreement-U.S. Interests and Turkish Needs.
ID-82-31: Published: May 7, 1982. Publicly Released: May 17, 1982 [onli-
ne], In: GEO U.S Government Accountability Oce [09.05.2024], Available
from: https://www.gao.gov/products/ID-82-31; https://www.gao.gov/
assets/140/137457.pdf
Úrad vlády (2016) “Programové vyhlásenie vlády SR na roky 2016-2020” [Program sta-
tement of the Slovak government for the years 2016-2020] [online], In: Úrad
vlády SR 2016 [online] [09.05.2024], Available from http://www.vlada.gov.
sk/programove-vyhlasenie-vlady-sr-na-roky-2016-2020/?pg=2
Ústava Slovenskej republiky [Constitution of the Slovak republic] [online], In: Zbier-
ka zákonov č. 460/1992 z 1. septembra 1992. [09.05.2024], Available from:
http://www.slpk.sk/dokumenty/ustava.pdf>
waiSová, Š., Mezinárodní organizace a režimy [International organizations and regimes]
Aleš Čeněk, Plzeň, 2008, ISBN 978-80-7380-109-0.
walt, S. M., The Origins of Alliances, Cornell University Press, Ithaca, NY, 1987.
Zmluva medzi vládou Československej socialistickej republiky a vládou Zväzu soviets-
kych socialistických republík o podmienkach dočasného pobytu soviets-
kych vojsk na území Československej socialistickej republiky z 18. októbra
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 323
International defense cooperation agreements - new opportunity or threat to a state sovereignty
1968. [ Agreement between the Government of the Czechoslovak Socialist
Republic and the Government of the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics on
the Conditions of the Temporary Residence of Soviet Troops on the Territor y
of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic of 18 October 1968] Zbierka zákonov
č. 11/1969 Zb.
Žilinka, M. (2022), PLNÉ ZNENIE PREJAVU M.ŽILINKU: Poslanci mu neumožnili vystúpiť
v NRSR. [FULL TEXT OF M. ŽILINKA’S SPEECH: Deputies did not allow him
to speak in the NRSR] [online] [09.05.2024], Available from: https://www.
teraz.sk/slovensko/poslanci-neschvalili-ziadost-general/610434-clanok.
html?utm_source=teraz&utm_medium=organic&utm_campaign=clic-
k&utm_content=.%253Bw%253BwIndex
Recibido: 3/8/2025
Aprobado: 10/10/2025
Accede a todo el contenido con una prueba gratuita de 7 días
Transforma tu investigación jurídica con vLex
-
Accede a resúmenes de sentencias generados por IA, que destacan al instante los aspectos jurídicos clave.
-
Realiza búsquedas avanzadas con opciones precisas de filtrado y ordenamiento.
-
Consulta contenido jurídico completo de más de 100 jurisdicciones, incluyendo una amplia colección de libros y revistas a texto completo.
-
Disfruta de funcionalidades exclusivas como comparador de versiones de una ley, notas de vigencia, análisis de citas, y mucho más.
-
Con la confianza de más de 2 millones de profesionales, incluidas las firmas más importantes del mundo.
Accede a todo el contenido con una prueba gratuita de 7 días
Transforma tu investigación jurídica con vLex
-
Accede a resúmenes de sentencias generados por IA, que destacan al instante los aspectos jurídicos clave.
-
Realiza búsquedas avanzadas con opciones precisas de filtrado y ordenamiento.
-
Consulta contenido jurídico completo de más de 100 jurisdicciones, incluyendo una amplia colección de libros y revistas a texto completo.
-
Disfruta de funcionalidades exclusivas como comparador de versiones de una ley, notas de vigencia, análisis de citas, y mucho más.
-
Con la confianza de más de 2 millones de profesionales, incluidas las firmas más importantes del mundo.
Accede a todo el contenido con una prueba gratuita de 7 días
Transforma tu investigación jurídica con vLex
-
Accede a resúmenes de sentencias generados por IA, que destacan al instante los aspectos jurídicos clave.
-
Realiza búsquedas avanzadas con opciones precisas de filtrado y ordenamiento.
-
Consulta contenido jurídico completo de más de 100 jurisdicciones, incluyendo una amplia colección de libros y revistas a texto completo.
-
Disfruta de funcionalidades exclusivas como comparador de versiones de una ley, notas de vigencia, análisis de citas, y mucho más.
-
Con la confianza de más de 2 millones de profesionales, incluidas las firmas más importantes del mundo.
Accede a todo el contenido con una prueba gratuita de 7 días
Transforma tu investigación jurídica con vLex
-
Accede a resúmenes de sentencias generados por IA, que destacan al instante los aspectos jurídicos clave.
-
Realiza búsquedas avanzadas con opciones precisas de filtrado y ordenamiento.
-
Consulta contenido jurídico completo de más de 100 jurisdicciones, incluyendo una amplia colección de libros y revistas a texto completo.
-
Disfruta de funcionalidades exclusivas como comparador de versiones de una ley, notas de vigencia, análisis de citas, y mucho más.
-
Con la confianza de más de 2 millones de profesionales, incluidas las firmas más importantes del mundo.
Accede a todo el contenido con una prueba gratuita de 7 días
Transforma tu investigación jurídica con vLex
-
Accede a resúmenes de sentencias generados por IA, que destacan al instante los aspectos jurídicos clave.
-
Realiza búsquedas avanzadas con opciones precisas de filtrado y ordenamiento.
-
Consulta contenido jurídico completo de más de 100 jurisdicciones, incluyendo una amplia colección de libros y revistas a texto completo.
-
Disfruta de funcionalidades exclusivas como comparador de versiones de una ley, notas de vigencia, análisis de citas, y mucho más.
-
Con la confianza de más de 2 millones de profesionales, incluidas las firmas más importantes del mundo.