Gender-based violence: a remedy case triggered by the CEDAW Committee

• Author: MSc. Manuel Fanega
• Pages: 90-102

90

Gender-based violence: a remedy case

triggered by the CEDAW Committee

MFLLM

Summary

1. Introducing the case

2. State negligence in the death of a child

 TheodysseyyearlongghtagainsttheState

4. Discussion: softness becomes hardness, universal becomes local

5. Concluding remarks

1. Introducing the case

ÁngelaGonzálezCarreñodidwhatgovernmentsnormally advise

she reported a crime. Furthermore, she did so repeatedly, informing the

police multiple times that she was afraid of her husband. However, for-

ty-seven reports were not enough to prevent the murder of her 7-year-

olddaughterÁngelabelievedthatthegovernmentwasresponsiblefor

thefailuretoprotectherdaughterslifesosheledacomplaintagainst

the administration. When her case was dismissed, she sought justice in

the Spanish courts, but again without success. It was not until the Com-

mieeontheEliminationofallFormsofDiscriminationagainstWomen

actedthattheSpanishcourtsnallyadmiedÁngelawasright

This essay wrien in honour of Professor María Acale an Ibero

Americanicon intheelds ofCriminalLaw and thedefence of wom-

en’s rights, explores how international instruments can be leveraged to

uphold human rights. First, as regards the available options, the com-

plainant appealed to a quasi-judicial agency rather than to the European

* Honorary Research Assistant, Department of Public International, Procedural

and Criminal Law, University of Cadiz, Spain. Member of the European Society

of Criminology. manuel.fanega@uca.es

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Court of Human Rights (ECtHR).1Secondregarding the eective-

ness of the instrument, the Convention on the Elimination of all Forms of

Discrimination against Women (CEDAW or the Convention)2 is a fully

binding treaty that must be enshrined in the domestic legal system and

implemented in the day-to-day work of the State. Although the deci-

sionsofitsCommiee constitute non-coercive recommendations, they

mayexertaconsiderableinuenceonStates

In fact, this case prompted a national court to acknowledge a State

violationofwomensrightssupportingtheideathattheCommieeis

ahelpfulmechanismABRIL STOFFELS3 discussed this topic in 2015,

questioningthe eectiveness of CEDAWdecisionsand noting Spains

failure to implement the Commiees recommendations regarding

Ángelascase4 which at that time wastrueHoweverÁngelasstrug-

gle did not end there. In 2018, after a 15-year-long odyssey, the Spanish

SupremeCourtaccepted theCommiees decisionEventuallyÁngela

was vindicated, her case resolved and she obtained a remedy.5

1 Although Spain has international human rights courts, some other rights

and human rights protection systems do not cfr BOYLE Katie  HUGES

Edel, “Identifying routes to remedy for violations of economic, social and cul-

tural rights”, The International Journal of Human Rights   p DOI

10.1080/13642987.2017.1390304.

2 UN General Assembly, Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination

against Women, 18 December 1979, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 1249, p. 13,

availableat hpswwwrefworldorgdocidaebhtmlaccessed April

Articleestablishes theCommieeon theEliminationof allFormsof

Discrimination against Women. The acronym CEDAW may refer to both the Con-

ventionandtheCommiee

3 ABRILSTOFFELSRuthTheeectivenessofCEDAWCommieeDecisions

Ángela González Carreño v Spain in Spanish Yearbook of International Law,

NoppDOIsybilavailableathpwwwsybil

es/documents/ARCHIVE/Vol19/27_Abril.pdf [accessed 19 April 2019].

4 The individual complaints procedure is an optional protocol, see: UN General As-

sembly, OptionalProtocoltotheConventionontheEliminationofAllFormsofDiscrim-

ination Against Women October UnitedNations TreatySeries vol

p availableat hpswwwrefworldorgdocidaebachtmlaccessed 

April 2019].

5 SeeSHELTONsdenitionof aremedy remedies are the processes by which argu-

able claims of human rights violations are heard and decided, whether by courts, admin-

istrative agencies, or other competent bodies. [A] second notion of remedies refers to the

outcomeofthe proceedingstherelief aordedthe successfulclaimantin SHELTON

Dinah, Remedies in International Human Rights Lawnd ed Oxford University

PressOxfordp

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In the discussion section, I shall analyse the implications of the case,

for instance highlighting strategies to advocate for human rights and

revisiting the provisions that link constitutional law to international

human rights law. I shall also examine how these international instru-

mentscaninuence criminalpolicies Thiscase isimportant becauseit

demonstrates that non-judicial or soft instruments, such as the UN hu-

manrightstreatymonitoringbodiesarebeginningtoexertmoreinu-

enceonState approachestohumanrightsHoweveritisnot sucient

for States to sign a treaty if the political will does not exist to comply

with the terms; not every mother is strong enough to demand justice for

fteenyears

2. State negligence in the death of a child

ÁngelamarriedFRCinBythenhehad alreadybeen violent

towards her. Andrea, their daughter, was born that year. In 1999, F.R.C

threatenedhiswifewithaknifeintheirchildspresenceÁngelaleftthe

marital residence and reported the incident to the authorities. F.R.C was

notconvicted but Ángela managed to escape she obtained a divorce

and custody of Andrea. F.R.C was granted use of the marital residence

and visiting rights.

Nevertheless, she continued to be the victim of his harassment, in-

timidation and death threats. Furthermore, the father used his visits

withhis daughter as a vehicle for his violence asking about Ángelas

privatelifeandinsulting herFRCwasonlypunishedwithane

“On one occasion, in 2000, he approached them at the entrance to the building

where they lived, insulting ÁngelaandaemptingtopullthegirlawayThe

[mother] managed to get into her car with Andrea and go to the police. F.R.C.

followedthemanduponreachingthe policestationinfront ofapoliceocer

continued to insult her, threatening to kidnap the girl. Seizing her by the hair

while Ángelahad Andrea in her arms, he tried to throw her to the ground.”6

ByÁngelahadled complaints requesting restraining or-

derstokeeptheoenderawayfromherandtheirdaughtersupervised

visits and the payment of child support. Eventually, a restraining order

oftenbreachedwasissuedonÁngelasbehalfHowevertheorderwas

notextendedto Ángelasdaughterbecausethe courtconsidered thatit

6 CEDAW, Comm. No. 47/2012, González Carreño v. SpainDecisionoftheCommiee

on the Elimination of Discrimination against Women, CEDAW/C/58/D/47/2012,

2014, para. 2.4.

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“hampered the visit regime and could seriously harm relations between father

and daughter”.7ThesedecisionsnegativelyaectedAndreaswellbeing

For example, she stated “that she did not like being with her father because he

did not treat her well and tore up her paintings”.8

Thenin a dierentcourtestablished thatthevisits shouldbe

supervised by social services. However, both social services and a psy-

chological evaluation subsequently recommended non-supervised vis-

its, despite the continuous violent incidents perpetrated by the paranoid

F.R.C.9 Hence, a year later, the court changed its mind and visits became

unsupervisedÁngelaappealedagainstthisdecisionwithoutsuccess

OnthemorningofAprilaftera courthearingontheuse of

the residence, “F.R.C. approached her and told her that he was going take away

what maered most to her.10 That afternoon, during an unsupervised

visitthefathershotÁngelasdaughterThenhecommiedsuicide

3. The odyssey: 15-year-long fight against the State

ExactlyoneyearlaterÁngelaledamiscarriageofjusticeclaimbe-

fore the Ministry of Justice, arguing that Andrea might otherwise still be

alive. However, the Ministry dismissed her claim on procedural grounds

in 2005.11 She appealed this administrative decision that year before the

same body, obtaining the same answer in 2007.

ÁngelastartedtoghtagainsttheSpanishMinistry ofJusticeFirst

sheledanappealbeforetheHighCourtagainsttheadministrativede-

cision, but her appeal was denied. Then, based on the same governmen-

tal decision, she went a step further and appealed to the Supreme Court,

but again without success.

Certain civil and political rights receive special protection in the

SpanishConstitutionviaspecicproceduresTherecurso de amparo is an

appealthatcanbeledbefore theConstitutional Courtin theeventof

violations of articles 14-30 of the Constitution.12 In this case, the right to

7 Ibid., para. 2.7.

8 Ibid., para. 2.8.

9 Ibid., para. 2.11.

10 Ibid., para. 2.16.

11 Ibid., para. 2.19.

12 Cfr. article 53 (2) of “The Spanish Constitution”, BOE, No. 311, 29 December 1978,

pp  available at hpswwwboeeslegislaciondocumentosCon-

stitucionINGLES.pdf [accessed 16 April, 2019].

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lifetherighttoaneectiveremedyandtherightofnondiscrimination

had been violated. Nevertheless, the Constitutional Court declined to

hear her appeal “as it lacked constitutional relevance”.13

Thus, all her appeals had been rejected, and all domestic remedies

had been exhausted. It should be noted that the European Convention of

Human Rights (ECHR)14 includes the aforementioned rights. However,

instead of going to the ECtHR, whose sentences are binding for Member

States, she turned to a universal human rights protection body: the Com-

mieeontheEliminationofDiscriminationagainstWomen

The CEDAW found that Spain had not ensured equality, had not ad-

opted appropriate criminal policies, had failed to protect against dis-

criminationeectivelyhadnotensuredthat thepublicauthoritieshad

acted to protect against discrimination against woman, had not modi-

edrulesorprocedureswhichconstitutediscriminationagainstwomen

had not fully observed the CEDAW recommendation on gender-based

violence15 and had failed to take appropriate measures to change sexist

culturalpaernswithinitssocietyandeliminatediscriminationinmat-

ters relating to marriage and family.

13 Constitutional Court orders of 13 April 2011 and 17 June 2011. See: Spanish Su-

preme Court, Cassation appeal 1002/2007, Sentence 1263/2018, 17 June 2018,

p  available at hpwwwpoderjudicialessearchcontenidosactionactio

ncontentpdfdatabasematchTSreferencestatsQueryId

calledfromsearchresultslinksFoptimize-

publicinterfacetrueaccessedApril

14 COUNCIL OF EUROPE European Convention for the Protection of Human

Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, as amended by Protocols Nos. 11 and 14”, 4

November 1950, ETSavailableathpswwwrefworldorgdocidaebb

html [accessed 19 April 2019].

15 OnCEDAWGeneralRecommendationNocfrUnitedNationsReport

oftheCommieeontheEliminationofDiscriminationagainstWomenEleventh

session”, General Assembly, Ocial Records, 47th Session, Supplement No. 38,

ANewYorkpp

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Fig. 1. The complainant’s odyssey.

The CEDAW published this decision together with recommendations

toawardÁngelacompensationandtoidentifyandchangewhateverwas

necessary to avoid future violations. However, Spain feigned innocence,

stating that the system was unbiased and that nothing could be done

to compensate the victim because no legal basis or structure existed for

thisÁngelawasobligedtocontinueghting

InsheledapetitionforreviewbeforetheMinistry ofJustice

arguing that the decision of 2005 should be reviewed since new actors

(CEDAW decision) had become involved. The government denied her

petition in 2015, despite the fact that international treaties form part of

the domestic legal system, as established by article 96 (1) of the Constitu-

tion. Furthermore, its article 10 (2) relies on international soft and hard

human rights standards to construct legal interpretations of fundamen-

talrightsAsbeforeÁngelaaskedthecourtstoreviewthisdecisionbut

both the High Court and the Supreme Court dismissed her appeal on

procedural grounds in 2016 and 2017, respectively.

HoweverbyÁngelahadleda newclaimbeforetheMinistry

ofJusticerequestingthattheCEDAWdecision be made eective and

seeking redress in the form of compensation for a miscarriage of justice.

This was her third appeal to the Ministry of Justice; however, the gov-

ernment’s response was silence. Literally. Although public administra-

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GCEDAWC

tions are obliged to answer citizens’ petitions,16 the Ministry of Justice

allowed time to pass, so the appeal was deemed rejected.

ÁngelaappealedthisdismissalbeforetheHighCourt which held

that the Spanish legal system did not have a procedure for rendering

CommieedecisionseectiveTheHighCourtalsoarguedthattheMin-

istry of Justice had not acted irregularly.17

Finally, the Supreme Court heard the appeal in cassation in 2018.18

Acknowledging the lack of an internal procedure to render CEDAW de-

cisionseectivethecourtaddedthatinthiscasetheCEDAWdecision

wassucienttoleaclaimforcompensationandthatfailingtodoso

implied a violation of the complainant’s fundamental rights.

TherulingwasfollowsrstÁngelahadsueredgenderbasedvio-

lence, meaning that her right to equal treatment and non-discrimination

on the basis of sex had been breached, as the CEDAW had also conclud-

ed; second, public administrations are bound by the Convention and the

OptionalProtocolandthereforehadadutytoprotectÁngelasphysical

and moral integrity.

Consequently, the Supreme Court overturned the High Court ruling

since it disregarded a fundamental rights violation; furthermore, it over-

turned the tacit rejection of the Ministry of Justice and sentenced this

administration to pay her €600,000 in compensation for moral harm.

4. Discussion: softness becomes hardness, universal

becomes local

The individual complaints procedure is an optional mechanism that

StatesmayrecogniseSpainratiedboththeConventionanditsOption-

alProtocol allowing nationalindividualsto le complaintsbeforethe

CommieeThe Commieeisa nonjudicialbodysimilar tootherUN

16 See article 21 (1) (“La Administración está obligada a dictar resolución expresa y a noti-

carlaentodoslosprocedimientos cualquieraqueseasuforma deiniciación[…]”), Law

NoofOctoberontheCommonAdministrativeProcedureofPub-

lic Administrations, BOENoOctoberpavailableathps

eurlexeuropaeulegalcontentESTXTPDFuriCELEXLESP

fromENaccessedApril

17 Spanish Supreme Court, Cassation appeal 1002/2007, Sentence 1263/2018, 17

Junepavailableathpwwwpoderjudicialessearchcontenidosac

tionactioncontentpdfdatabasematchTSreferencestatsQueryI

dcalledfromsearchresultslinksFoptimi

zepublicinterfacetrueaccessedApril

18 Ibid.

97

MF

human rights protection mechanisms such as the inquiry mechanism or

inter-state communications. These structures do not constitute courts;

therefore “their decisions or reports are not binding and they cannot sanction

anyoendingState”.19 In other words, “[w]hatever the nature of the decision

that may be adopted, it will not constitute a judgement nor be obligatory for the

States concerned”,20 therefore they are “non-binding decisions”.21 Neverthe-

less, the obligation to adhere to the decisions of treaty-based bodies is

nowamaerofdebate

Additionallyoneof Spainsreasons fornot grantingÁngela arem-

edy was that there were no legal channels for enforcing CEDAW resolu-

tionsOn thelackof enforceability ofsoftresolutions it hasbeensaid

that “manywriters includethe elementof enforceability intheir denitionof

legal rights, because the notion of rights entails a correlative duty on the part of

otherstoactorrefrainfromactingforthe benetoftherightsholderUnlessa

duty is somehow enforced, it risks being seen as a voluntary obligation that can

befullledorignoredatwill”22

However, it can be argued that Spain’s excuse was invalid because

the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties states that domestic law

maynotbeinvokedasajusticationforfailuretocomplywithinterna-

tionallaw as BOERNEFIJN23 has recalled Furthermore FERRAJOLI24

has indicated that a constitutional State should not be constricted by nar-

row-minded and short-sighted legal procedures: the law must always

uphold the underlining principles of justice, such as equality or the pro-

tection of rights, principles which are in fact recognised in constitutions.

19 SAURA, Jaume, “El sistema de las Naciones Unidas de protección de los derechos

humanosinGUTIÉRREZCASTILLO VíctorLuiset al., Sistema universal de pro-

tección de los derechos humanosFUOC Fundación paralaUniversitat Oberta de

Catalunya Barcelona  p  available at hpopenaccessuoceduwe-

bapps/o2/handle/10609/68305 [accessed 19 April 2019].

20 Ibid., p. 15.

21 OCHOARUIZNataliaGUTIERREZCASTILLOVíctorProteccióninternacio-

naldeladignidadhumanainGUTIÉRREZCASTILLOVíctorLuis et al., Sistema

universal de protección de los derechos humanosFUOCFundación para laUniver-

sitatObertade CatalunyaBarcelona p availableathpopenaccess

uoc.edu/webapps/o2/handle/10609/68305 [accessed 19 April 2019].

22 SHELTONDinah Remedies in International Human Rights Law, nded Oxford

UniversityPressOxfordp

23 BOEREFIJN Ineke Establishing State Responsibility for Breaching Human

RightsTreatyObligationsAvenuesUnder UNHumanRights TreatiesNether-

lands International Law ReviewpDOISX

24 FERRAJOLILuigiRazonesjurídicasdelPacismoTroaMadridp

98

GCEDAWC

As mentioned earlier, according to articles 96 (1) and 10 (2) of the

Spanish Constitution, the law must be interpreted and applied in line

with international human rights legislation. A State party must therefore

adhere to international rulings, even at administrative level, as if these

weredomestic lawsThisis nottherst time thatinternational bodies

have acted as sources of domestic law.25 Since these treaties are legally

binding and hierarchically located at the top of the Spanish legal sys-

tem, local, regional and national governments must all adhere to them

in their policies: judicial recognition is not necessary to protect rights.

Anothermaer toaddress iswhetherthe resolutionsoftreaty bod-

ies constitute soft or hard law. First, it is important to remember that

the aim of soft law is to create communication channels between the

powerfulcommunity and the State in ordertoobligethelaer to act

in a given way, but without the feeling of doing so under coercion.26

OtherwiseStatesmightthinktwicebeforebindingthemselvestosome

treaties’ provisions. Although the Convention on the Elimination of all

Forms of Discrimination against Women or adhesion to the individual

complaints procedure are considered hard law, there is however some

roomformanoeuvrein applicationofCEDAWCommieerecommen-

dations. Consequently, since CEDAW recommendations or resolutions

are not enforceable, they may be seen as soft law, or at least softer than a

treatyNonethelessitisalsotruethatastheCommieeisabranchofthe

ConventionandtheConventionishardlawCommiee rulingsmight

comprise hard law too. Whether soft or not, the truth is that CEDAW

decisionsexertasubstantialinuenceonStatedecisionsashasbeenthe

caseinSpainOnEuropeanUnionLawJIMÉNEZGARCÍAhasclaried

several aspects of soft law that are very similar to those analysed here:

“Even if soft law does not impose obligations or grant rights, it does bind the

national courts in terms of an instrument to be taken into account; there is not

a direct duty to comply, but it is an obligation to take into consideration in the

course of proceedings”.27

25 SeeegontheIACHRJIMÉNEZGARCÍAFranciscoInternationalLawin

mutation. The “civilizing” test of the international rule of law (soft-law of high

or low intensity?) and the regime of the peace stabilization forces”, Revista

electrónica de estudios internacionalesNopDOIreei

availableathpwwwreeiorgindexphprevistanumarticulosderecho

internacional-mutacion-test-civilizatorio-estado-derecho-internacional-soft-law-

baja-alta-intensidad-regimen-fuerzas-estabilizacion-paz [accessed 19 April 2019].

26 Ibid. p. 19.

27 JIMÉNEZGARCÍAibidp citesSARMIENTODanielEl derecho de la unión

europea, Marcial Pons, Madrid, 2016. Translation of: “[…] aunque el soft law no

99

MF

Things have changed since Spain showed a “lack of will […] to follow

therecommendationsofthisCommiee”.28 In short, there is no longer a “lack

ofenforceabilityofthesedecisionstoSpainand thelimitedeectivenessofthis

mechanism to guarantee that the victims of a breach of the convention get an

appropriate compensation when the State lacks the political will to do it”. 29 The

SpanishSupremeCourthasnallyestablishedthatCommieedecisions

are instruments that must necessarily be taken into account in domestic

proceedingsRatied UN treaty bodies decisions areasourceof law

Nonetheless, is it too naïve to think that the States would also be obliged

tocomplywithCommieerulingsonthirdcountries

Bethatasitmayas analternativeto thecourtsÁngelascasehigh-

lights the possibility of using the individual complaints procedure to

seek quasi-judicial justice through the UN’s human rights bodies, includ-

ing CEDAW, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights

CommieeCCPR the Commiee on EconomicSocial and Cultural

RightsCESCR theCommieeagainst TortureCATtheCommiee

ontheElimination ofRacialDiscriminationCERDthe Commieeon

theRightsofPersonswith Disabilities CRPD the Commiee on the

Rightsof the ChildCRCalsothe Optional Protocols onsaleof chil-

drenchild prostitution andchildpornography OPSC andonthe in-

volvementofchildreninarmedconictOPACandtheCommieeon

Enforced Disappearances (CED).

Nevertheless, the CEDAW recommendation to Spain is still not fully

eectiveIthadtwo equallybindingpartsThersttocompensatethe

victim, has been implemented, but the second, on policy changes, has

notGemaFernándezRodríguezdeLiévanaÁngelaslawyerhasindi-

cated that the State must also comply with the rest of the recommenda-

tion. Currently, most of these measures have yet to be implemented.30

imponga obligaciones ni otorgue derechos, sí vincula a los tribunales naciona-

les en cuanto instrumento “a tener en cuenta”, no se trata de una obligación de

“aplicación”, sino de una obligación de toma en consideración en el curso de una

aplicación”.

28 ABRILSTOFFELSRuthTheeectivenessofCEDAWCommieeDecisions

ÁngelaGonzálezCarreñovSpaininSpanish Yearbook of International Law,

NoppDOISybilavailableathpwww

sybil.es/documents/ARCHIVE/Vol19/27_Abril.pdf [accessed 19 April 2019].

29 Ibid.

30 KOHANMarisa TribunalSupremo las clavesde unasentencia históricaque

saca los colores a España”, in Público availableat hpswwwpu-

blico.es/sociedad/angela-gonzalez-tribunal-supremo-claves-sentencia-historica-

saca-colores-espana.html [accessed 19 April 2019].

100

GCEDAWC

Likewise, McQUIGG found similar results to those discussed here, for

example that in order “[to foster women’s rights] the judiciary must also

have a strong desire to protect the rights of the victims”31 and that beyond

remedies, “a litigation strategy will not result in change unless such transfor-

mation is supported by the legislative and the public”.32

The case was heard by the CEDAW. This reinforces the universal fact

that the breach of rights due to discrimination against a woman, such

astheviolation ofÁngelasdaughtersrightto lifeisnotdomesticbut

genderbasedviolence Additionally as Ángelasdaughterwaskilled

and since the right to life is protected under the ECHR, one might still

wonderwhyÁngeladidnotelecttolodgeanappealbeforetheECtHR

whose decisions are more enforceable than those of a non-judicial body.

Further study will be required to elucidate this point. In addition, future

researchshouldexplorehowdecisiveoreectiveothertreatymonitor-

ing bodies’ resolutions could be in practice, beyond the individual com-

plaints procedure analysed here. For example, a ruling in South Africa

cited CEDAW General Recommendation 1933 as an argument to demon-

strate liability for failing in the duty to protect a woman.34

5. Concluding remarks

ThisremedytriggeredbytheCEDAWCommieeisdiscussedhere

within the international community, to demonstrate how the Spanish ju-

diciary has created domestic case law strengthening the decisions of UN

treatybodiesTheCommieesdecisionscompriseeectivemechanisms

whenthecomplainantispersistentÁngelawasnallygrantedaremedy

because she fought tirelessly for justice, despite Spain’s combative resis-

tance. Nevertheless, States are still reluctant to comply with all CEDAW

recommendationson criminal orsocioculturalpolicies Ángelasodys-

sey shows how one State seemed unwilling to follow international law,

as if States were not bound by their own international commitments.

Eventually, Spain acknowledged its failure to protect women’s rights,

31 McQUIGG, Ronagh J.A., “How could human rights law be used by the courts to

assist victims of domestic violence? A comparative study”, in The International

Journal of Human RightspDOI

32 Ibid., p. 360.

33 UN Report of the Commiee on the Elimination of Discrimination against

Women: Eleventh session”, General Assembly, 47th Session, OcialRecordsSup-

plement No. 38, A/47/38NewYork

34 McQUIGG, Ronagh J.A., “How could human rights law be used by the courts to

assist victims of domestic violence? A comparative study”, in The International

Journal of Human RightsppDOI

101

MF

transformingsoftlawintohardlawinaninternationallyveriedbreach

of human rights.

References

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DecisionsÁngelaGonzálezCarreñovSpaininSpanish Yearbook of

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