Cuba: ¿sancionada por Estados Unidos?
| Author | Ph.D. Desiree Llaguno Cerezo y M.Sc. Elizabeth Valdés-Miranda Fernández |
| Position | Assistant professor of International Public Law and International Commercial and Economic Law Law School of the University of Havana (Cuba) / Associate Professor of International Public Law and Maritime. Law Law School of the University of Havana (Cuba) |
| Pages | 287-301 |
ARTÍCULO DE INVESTIGACIÓN
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 287
VOL. 3, NO. 2, JULIODICIEMBRE, PP. 287301, 2023
CUBA: SANCTIONED BY THE UNITED STATES?
Cuba: ¿sancionada por Estados Unidos?
Ph.D. Desiree Llaguno Cerezo
Assistant professor of International Public Law and
International Commercial and Economic Law
Law School of the University of Havana (Cuba)
https://orcid.org/0000-0003-2910-0577
desiree@lex.uh.cu
M.Sc. Elizabeth Valdés-Miranda Fernández
Associate Professor of International Public Law and
Maritime Law
Law School of the University of Havana (Cuba)
https://orcid.org/0000-0001-7434-3194
elizabeth.valdesmiranda@lex.uh.cu
Abstract
During the last six decades, the United States has applied countless punitive me-
asures against Cuba, especially in the economic sphere. Throughout this period
Washington has used various arguments to justify these actions, however, a ca-
reful analysis of them shows that their main objective has been to force a change
in the economic, political and social system in Cuba. Despite the international
controversy and uncertainties regarding international sanctions, it is clear that
the application of measures aimed at regime change in another sovereign state
is incompatible with current international law.
Keywords: Cuba; United States; sanctions; international law.
Resumen
Durante las últimas seis décadas, Estados Unidos ha aplicado innumerables
medidas punitivas contra Cuba, especialmente en el ámbito económico. A lo largo
de este periodo, Washington ha utilizado diversos argumentos para justicar
estas acciones, sin embargo, un análisis cuidadoso de estas demuestra que su
principal objetivo ha sido forzar un cambio en el sistema económico, político y
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Ph.D. Desiree Llaguno Cerezo y M.Sc. Elizabeth Valdés-Miranda Fernández
social en Cuba. A pesar de las controversias e incertidumbres internacionales en
torno a las sanciones internacionales, es evidente que la aplicación de medidas
dirigidas a un cambio de régimen en otro Estado soberano es incompatible con
el Derecho internacional vigente.
Palabras claves: Cuba; Estados Unidos; sanciones; Derecho internacional.
Summary
1. Introduction. 2. Sanctions in international law. 3. Cuba: a sanctioned country? 4. Conclu-
sions. Bibliography.
1. INTRODUCTION
The issue of sanctions is one of the most controversial in contemporary in-
ternational law. The theoretical and political debate is especially ercer with
respect to unilateral sanctions. The dubious legality and eectiveness of these
actions generate numerous economic, political and legal conicts, for which
the international order today has no clear solution.
Since the second half of the last century, the major powers have increasingly
resorted to the application of unilateral measures, replacing the use or threat
of use of force as a foreign policy tool. These actions often use the protection of
human rights, democracy or the rule of law as legitimizing arguments for their
actions. However, they often conceal the intention to provoke regime change
in the “target” state for economic, strategic or ideological purposes. For this re-
ason, developing countries have continually opposed the imposition of these
misnamed sanctions, arguing that they imply a hierarchy alien to the inter-
national legal order, which allows one State to impose restrictions of its own
choosing in order to put pressure on another sovereign State.
The international sanctions par excellence are those adopted by the UN within
the collective security mechanism provided for in Chapter VII of its founding
treaty. Regional agreements or organizations may also apply sanctions, sub-
ject to authorization by the Security Council.1 However, unilateral coercive me-
asures2 can only be considered lawful –and therefore sanctions themselves–
1 Charter of the United Nations, Article 53.
2 Considered as such not only those adopted by a State individually or in coordination with
others, but also those taken by a regional organization in relation to non-member States,
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 289
Cuba: sanctioned by the United States?
when they constitute countermeasures,3 subject to the limitations imposed in
that regard by international law.
Since the beginning of the process of political, economic and social transfor-
mation of deep popular roots that the Cuban Revolution represented, the Uni-
ted States has applied a series of unilateral coercive measures that Washington
has tried to present as legitimate international sanctions. This paper aims to
This paper aims to conduct a doctrinal study of international sanctions in inter-
national law from the perspective of their ultimate purpose and their interac-
tion with the structural principles of the international legal order. It also propo-
ses to analyze the unilateral coercive system of the United States towards Cuba
in its relationship with the structural principles of International Law.
2. SANCTIONS IN INTERNATIONAL LAW
The term “international sanctions” is dicult to dene and is used to denote
conduct of various kinds. This is due to the absence of an established concept
in international literature and custom, the lack of a multilateral treaty speci-
cally referring to international sanctions,4 as well as the multiplicity of eco-
nomic and geopolitical interests involved. Most of the doctrinal denitions of
sanctions5 agree that they seek to “inuence”, by means of coercion,6 the beha-
without prior approval of the Security Council. hoVell, Devika, Unnished business of interna-
tional law: the questionable legality of autonomous sanctions (symposium on unilateral target-
ed sanctions, 2019), doi:10.1017/aju.2019.
3 Understood as “measures of reaction of the subject aected by an unlawful act of another,
which seek to restore respect for the law and induce the oending State to comply with the
obligations arising from responsibility for the oense committed”. diez de Velasco ValleJo, Ma-
nuel, Instituciones de Derecho Internacional Público.
4 hoVell, Devika, Unnished business…., cit.
5 rahMaT, Mohamad, “Unilateral Sanctions in International Law: A Quest for Legality”, in Ali Z. Ma-
rossi and Marisa R. Bassett (eds.), Economic Sanctions under International Law. Unilateralism,
Multilateralism, Legitimacy, and Consequences, pp. 71-83; Milaninia, Nema, “Jus ad bellum eco-
nomicum and jus in bello economico: The Limits of Economic Sanctions Under the Paradigm
of International Humanitarian Law”, in Ali Z. Marossi and Marisa R. Bassett (eds.), Economic
Sanctions…, cit., pp. 95-125; hoVell, Devika, Unnished business…., cit.; del olMo díaz, Marçal,
“La práctica de las sanciones internacionales en el derecho internacional ¿son legítimas las
sanciones que se le aplican a Venezuela?”, Tesis de grado, p. 10; Velásquez cruz, Lisbeth and
Pérez salas, Alan, “Medidas coercitivas internacionales: una afectación a los derechos hu-
manos y libertades fundamentales”, Política Internacional, No. 5, 2020, p. 54.
6 Entendida coerción como coacción potencial o posibilidad de uso de la fuerza. herrera
guerra, Jorge, “Las sanciones del derecho internacional”, Agenda internacional, Vol. 4, No. 10,
1998, p. 115.
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Ph.D. Desiree Llaguno Cerezo y M.Sc. Elizabeth Valdés-Miranda Fernández
vior of the sanctioned State. It is therefore essential, in order to determine the
legality of the measures and their correct qualication as international sanc-
tions, to unravel what type of modication is being sought.
A common element in several of the current sanctions regimes is the purpose
of forcing a change in the political regime of the “target” States, rather than
correcting violations of international law. This type of pressure measures on
sovereign states has no international legal basis. The International Court of
Justice has ruled against the use of coercive methods with regard to choices
that should remain free, such as the choice of their political, economic, social,
cultural and foreign policy formulation.7
The stated purposes of sanctions and their true objective or ultimate aim hi-
ghlight the recurrent contradiction between “ought” and “might” in internatio-
nal law. The real objectives of the “sanctioners” may dier from those that have
been made public. The boundaries between legitimate foreign policy actions
and acts in violation of international law are thus blurred.
It should be recalled that unilateral coercive measures can only exceptionally
be considered lawful when they seek to induce a State to comply with the
obligations arising from the relationship of responsibility resulting from the
commission of an internationally wrongful act. Consequently, objectives na-
turalized in international legal literature8 and practice, such as changes in the
internal or foreign policy of a State, its destabilization, as well as showing disa-
pproval of its actions or even responding to conicts between internal politi-
cal forces in the sanctioning country, create a hierarchy between “sanctioners”
and “sanctioned” that contradicts the horizontal structure of the international
system, as long as they are not related to or go beyond the cessation of a vio-
lation of international law.9 This type of measures, adopted as a kind of interna-
tional punishment, are incompatible with the principle of sovereign equality
of States.
7 Military and Paramilitary Activities (Nicaragua v. United States of America), STC I.C.J. de 27 de
junio de 1986.
8 del olMo díaz, Marçal, La práctica de las sanciones…, cit. pp. 14-16; ceTina conTreras, Álvaro,
Natalia serrano corTes and Laura Torrado roJas, “Análisis de las sanciones económicas en el
derecho económico internacional”, Tesis de grado, pp. 53-54; Téllez núñez, Andrés, “Una mirada
a la vivencia del derecho internacional desde la perspectiva de las sanciones económicas
unilaterales”, revista Derecho del Estado, No. 42, 2019, pp. 311-338.
9 hoFer, Alexandra R., “Creación y contestación de la jerarquía: efecto punitivo de las sanciones
en un sistema horizontal”, Revista CIDOB d’Afers Internacionals, 125, 2020.
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Cuba: sanctioned by the United States?
Sovereignty is a pillar of interstate relations. Its double armation is generally
accepted: internally as the supreme authority to make decisions and enforce
them in a given territory and with respect to a given population; externally
as the absence of supreme international authority, which implies the inde-
pendence of States.10 It is expressed in the principle of sovereign equality of
States, a peremptory norm of customary international law, codied in Article 2(1)
of the Charter of the United Nations and developed by the Declaration on
Principles of International Law concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations of 1970.11
The sovereign equality of States is consubstantial with the horizontality of the
international legal order and refers fundamentally to legal equality, without
ignoring the enormous de facto inequalities between States.12 As a structural
principle of international law, it is expressed in normative, formal and existen-
tial practice.13 The plurality of the international legal order is based on it, insofar
as it guarantees the freedom of States to choose and develop their own politi-
cal, social and economic systems. It implies the right of States to their existen-
ce, embodied in their territorial integrity and political independence, which is
linked to the principle of refraining from intervening in their internal aairs.
That is why sanctions that openly or covertly propose a change of regime, as
well as those that unilaterally qualify and treat sovereign States as “criminal”,
“failed” or “illegal” deprive them of their sovereign rights,14 undermining the
international legal order in terms of sovereign equality, non-intervention in
the internal aairs of States and other principles such as good faith and the
peaceful settlement of disputes.
The limitations of the collective security mechanism of the United Nations re-
lated to the veto of the permanent members of the Security Council, who can
block the application of international sanctions, should not be replaced by the
unilateral action of countries with sucient power to apply coercive measures
in “defense of the common good”. This practice not only undermines the au-
10 BroTóns, Antonio Remiro, et al., Derecho internacional Curso general, pp. 89-93.
11 Declaration of Principles of International Law Concerning Friendly Relations and Cooperation
among States in accordance with the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res 2625 (XV), U.N.
Doc. A/RES/25/2625 (24 October 1970).
12 diez de Velasco ValleJo, Manuel, Organizaciones internacionales, pp. 168-169.
13 hoFer, Alexandra R., Creación y contestación de la jerarquía…, cit., p. 17.
14 siMPson, Gerry, Great Powers and Outlaw States Unequal Sovereigns in the International Legal Or-
der, p. 55.
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thority of the universal organization, but also creates the conditions to clothe
acts in violation of the international legal order with apparent legality.
The argument that the principle of non-intervention in the internal aairs of
States must give way to the “democratic principle” is legally erroneous and
politically dangerous for the preservation of international peace and securi-
ty. Today there is an emerging principle, based on the practice of States and
certain international organizations –notably the European Union and the Or-
ganization of American States– in favor of the development of human rights
and fundamental freedoms, which grants individuals and peoples the right to
be governed democratically. However, it cannot yet be considered as a funda-
mental or structural principle of international law, on a par with the principle
of non-intervention.15
The tension between the emergence of the democratic principle and the va-
lidity of the right of States to freely choose their political system is palpable in
contemporary international society. Every day, examples are reported of how
powerful states impose unilateral coercive measures under the pretext of fa-
voring the establishment of democratic regimes in all parts of the world, with
eects radically contrary to these “democratizing” objectives. This pattern of
behavior in turn reveals a contradictory positioning of the promoters of demo-
cracy, which goes so far as to violate fundamental norms of international law.
The success of these intrusions into the conduct of another sovereign state
–with regime change as the ultimate expression– is only possible because of
the profoundly unequal essence of international society, expressed in all sphe-
res of international relations. The marked asymmetry between developed and
underdeveloped countries is what allows the former to “inuence” the latter,
bending their will. In such circumstances, the “sanctioners” perceive themsel-
ves as subjects with the power and the “responsibility” to defend international
legality. This implies a unilateral evaluation of the conduct of the “oending”
country and the extraterritorial application of the sanctioned country’s do-
mestic law, sifted by its national interests. As a result, a system of standards,
norms, values or patterns of conduct is imposed, not necessarily international
or written, which may be alien to the sanctioned country and even to the in-
ternational legal order.16
15 díaz Barrado, Cástor M., El Derecho Internacional del tiempo presente, pp. 76-98.
16 álVarez záraTe, José M., “Las sanciones económicas internacionales”, Con-Texto, 3, 1998,
pp. 50-56.
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Cuba: sanctioned by the United States?
On the other hand, in recent years there has been growing international con-
cern about the negative impact of coercive measures in general, and in par-
ticular those of an economic nature. Particularly alarming has been the dete-
rioration of basic human rights such as life, food and health of civilian popu-
lations as a consequence of the application of international sanctions.17 This
“collateral damage” is often a result calculated to catalyze the regime change
pursued by the sanctions, which not only violates the most elementary ethical
and moral principles, but also the purposes and principles of the United Na-
tions Charter and International Humanitarian Law. Additionally, the harmful
eect of this conduct on the development of the sanctioned countries and the
international economy undermines the achievement of the Sustainable Deve-
lopment Goals adopted by the international community in 2015.18
As outlined above, the increase and diversication of conicts, globalization
and interdependence have favored the perception of unilateral coercive mea-
sures as valid alternatives to the use of force, regardless of their legality. Their
lower economic cost, compared to military action, for the country applying
them and their better international reception have made economic sanctions
measures the tool of choice of the major powers. However, as has been poin-
ted out, their high impact on the economy and life of “target” states can often
be equated with that caused by the use of force.19
This new reality has fueled the debate on the objective scope of the principle
of prohibition of the threat and use of force, as a general peremptory norm of
customary law enshrined in Article 2(4) of the Charter. The majority of the ius-
publicist doctrine continues to arm that the use of force is reserved almost
exclusively to armed force,20 thus excluding political and economic coercion.21
17 rahMaT, Mohamad, “Unilateral Sanctions in International Law…”, cit., pp. 74-75; Milaninia, Nema,
“Jus ad bellum economicum…”, cit., pp. 99-100; de Waar, Paul, “Economic Sanctions Infringing
Human Rights: Is There a Limit?”, in Ali Z. Marossi and Marisa R. Bassett (eds.), Economic Sanc-
tions…, cit., pp. 125-145; siMonen, Katariina, “Economic Sanctions Leading to Human Rights
Violations: Constructing Legal Argument”, in Ali Z. Marossi and Marisa R. Bassett (eds.), Eco-
nomic Sanctions…, cit., pp. 179-197.
18 Gordon, Joy, “Unilateral Sanctions: Creating Chaos at Bargain Rates”, in Surya P. Subedim (ed.),
Unilateral sanctions in International Law, pp. 87-106.
19 Milaninia, Nema, “Jus ad bellum economicum…”, cit., p. 108.
20 Ibidem.
21 A la conrmación de esta postura tributan el proceso codicador de la Carta de las Naciones
Unidas y las negociaciones de posteriores resoluciones de la Asamblea General de la organi-
zación, donde no fue aceptada la propuesta de incluir la coerción económica entre los usos
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It seems too early to consider the normative framework of the Charter in this
matter as superseded, however, it is not idle to reevaluate the scope of the use
of force in the context of unilateral coercive measures aimed at regime change.
The abuse by one State of its dominant position in international relations to di-
rectly or indirectly demand a change of policy from another sovereign State is
based on the same reasons why States have traditionally resorted to war, trans-
gressing diplomatic, ethical and moral principles. Unilateral coercive measures
are not peaceful means of settling international disputes, and their potential
for endangering international peace and security grows with their destructi-
ve capacity in “target” States. Consequently, it would not be unreasonable in
the future for them to be classied as acts of violence or unauthorized uses
of force.22
This argument gains force when it comes to unilateral coercive measures un-
der the term “economic warfare”23, whose impact on civilian populations can
reach proportions similar to those produced by conventional military attacks.24
Even when these measures are intended to redress an international wrong, if
they additionally pursue economic, political or territorial objectives and be-
nets contrary to the interests of the “target” States, they could be considered
acts of war because of their intentionality, scope and destructive potential.25
Economic and nancial measures aimed at regime change are generally classi-
ed as economic warfare insofar as they seek to alter the normal development
of international economic, commercial and nancial relations without any real
justication, by means of excessive violence. Their ultimate objective of politi-
cal, economic and social destabilization of the aected countries is incompati-
ble with current international law.
de la fuerza. El uso del término, tanto en el preámbulo de la Carta, como en los artículos del
43 al 47, también apunta en este sentido. Por otra parte, algunas interpretaciones amplias de
la Resolución 42/22 de la Asamblea General pretenden acoger la posición contraria. diez de
Velasco, Manuel, Instituciones…, cit., pp. 1069-1072.
22 álVarez záraTe, José M., “Las sanciones…”, cit., p. 52.
23 ceTina conTreras, Álvaro, Natalia serrano corTes, and Laura Torrado roJas, Análisis de las sanciones
económicas…, cit., pp. 14-16; Joyner, Daniel H., “International Legal Limits on the Ability of
States to Lawfully Impose International Economic/Financial Sanctions”, in Ali Z. Marossi and
Marisa R. Bassett (eds.), Economic Sanctions…, cit., pp. 83-95.
24 Milaninia, Nema, “Jus ad bellum economicum…”, cit., pp. 83-95.
25 Téllez núñez, Andrés, “A look at the experience of international law…”, cit., pp. 311-338.
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Cuba: sanctioned by the United States?
The absence of a specic international regulation of unilateral coercive me-
asures and of an impartial authority empowered to control their legality and
eectiveness not only reects, but deepens the inequality in international re-
lations, hindering peace and international cooperation and weakening the in-
ternational legal order.
Unilateral sanctions have often been openly associated with the objective of
a change in the political-ideological system, the initiation of transitions or the
calling of presidential elections in the “target” State, under the gnoseology of
third States on democracy. Such pretensions are based, as Sepúlveda pointed
out, on the inequalities in the international order, resulting from the assimila-
tion of the condition of “power” by some nations such as the United States, the
European Union (EU), Canada and Australia, based on their real superiority in
economic, military and technological terms.
The interests of the “sanctioning” states are related not only to the better deve-
lopment of international relations, but also to the assumption by other states
of specic internal models of political-state organization. Each unilateral coer-
cive action aimed at making another State exercise its internal and external
powers in accordance with the expectations of the “sanctioner” has repercus-
sions not only on the actions of the “target” State, but also on the life of the
social actors within it, whatever their status.
Unilateral coercive measures, particularly economic ones, often do not in
themselves achieve the intended change in the political system of the “target”
state. They do, however, cause unquantiable damage to institutional structu-
res and the lives of the population. At present they have delayed or nullied
options for economic, social, labor, cultural and educational development. In
particular, they have hindered the optimal way in which the negative eects of
the Covid-19 pandemic should be circumvented.
3. CUBA: A SANCTIONED COUNTRY?
With the 1959 Revolution, a model of political and legal subordination be-
tween the United States and Cuba was broken. It quickly led to a confrontation
of interests between the two states, which dominates bilateral relations to this
day. It marked the international positioning of the Cuban state. The foreign
policy of the new government of the Island was articulated around a marked
preponderance of national interest, the defense of sovereignty and self-deter-
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mination. This quickly led to a confrontation of interests that came to domina-
te Cuba-US bilateral relations to the present day.
On February 3, 1962, President John F. Kennedy announced the decision to
prohibit the exchange of goods and services with Cuba, in Proclamation 3447
“Embargo on All Trade with Cuba”.26 This prohibition, historically presented as
a response to the nationalization of U.S. properties in Cuba, transcended from
its genesis the Cuban-U.S. relations as it had its cause in a regional collective
action as a result of the exclusion of Cuba from the Organization of American
States (OAS). Thus began a long history of unilateral actions that constitute the
hard core of the hostile US policy towards Cuba.
This trade ban has been expanding and nurtured by the initiatives of each new
U.S. administration, always with the aim of imposing more restrictions and
brakes on the Cuban economy. The measures have originated both in the exe-
cutive and in the U.S. legislature, which has led to a convergence of regulations
of dierent nature and scope, with a multiplicity of mechanisms for their modi-
cation, termination and abrogation, which does not allow in any scenario the
automatic elimination of the penalties against Cuba.
Among the laws and sections of laws that make up the normative framework
of this policy can be mentioned, following the most recent Report of Cuba to
the General Assembly of the UN: Trade with the Enemy Act of 1917, Foreign
Assistance Act of 1961, Export Administration Act of 1979, Cuban Democra-
cy Act (Torricelli Act) of 1992, Cuban Liberty and Democratic Solidarity Act
(Helms-Burton Act) of 1996, Section 211 of the Supplemental and Emergency
Appropriations Act for scal year 1999 and the Trade Sanctions Reform and
Export Enhancement Act of 2000. In addition, other regulations to which the
aforementioned regulations refer are indirectly applicable.
The vocation of permanence in time of these legal instruments guarantees the
continuity of the policy of strangulation towards Cuba, even beyond the par-
ticular vision of whoever occupies the White House. With these norms, Washin-
gton intends to legislate all aspects of life - commercial, political, electoral, etc.
- of another equal in international society, Cuba in this case. In this line, it goes
so far as to make explicit, with potential legal consequences, the treatment
that the US will give to third States that do not assume as their own the po-
26 Proclamation 3447-Embargo in all trade with Cuba (February 03, 1962) [online], Avail-
able online: https://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/documents/proclamation-3447-embar-
go-all-trade-with-cuba
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Cuba: sanctioned by the United States?
sitions of the northern power vis-à-vis the Caribbean archipelago. Laws such
as Torricelli and Helms Burton constitute clear violations of the principles of
sovereign equality and non-intervention in the internal aairs of States as set
forth in International Law, for the violation of which no State can hide behind
its domestic law.
The rhetoric in these regulations, particularly visible in the Helms Burton Act,
revolves around the supposed “support for the people of Cuba”, while esta-
blishing restrictions on trade, transactions with Cuba, travel to and from the
island, the purchase and sale of property in which Cuba or Cuban nationals
have an interest, among others. The Act goes beyond anything imaginable by
explicitly providing for how a change of government should be implemented
in Cuba. Throughout the Helms-Burton Act, 75 times the President of the Uni-
ted States is granted prerogatives related to the Cuban political development,
such as: promoting in the Security Council a mandatory international embargo
similar to the one applied in Haiti; encouraging other countries to restrict trade
and credit relations with Cuba in a manner consistent with the purposes of the
Act; adopting immediate measures in order to apply the sanctions foreseen
against countries that help Cuba; submit to Congress periodic reports on the
progress of the implementation of the Act, including the status of Cuba’s trade
with third countries and the provision of assistance by third countries to Cuba;
instruct the U.S. chief executive ocers of international nancial institutions
to permanently oppose Cuba’s access to such institutions until the President
makes known his assessment that a democratically elected government exists
in Cuba. In the same vein, the US President will provide assistance to indivi-
duals and independent non-governmental organizations in support of Cuba’s
democratization eorts; take the necessary steps to urge the OAS to create a
special emergency fund specically for the purpose of deploying human rights
observers and supporting the holding of elections in Cuba, to which it will pro-
vide no less than $5 million as a voluntary contribution; among many others.
By 1996, Cuba was already a member of the World Trade Organization (WTO)
and had made constitutional and legislative modications to insert itself into
the international value chain. In 1992 a constitutional reform had taken place,
in 1994 the Foreign Investment Law and the Tax Law were enacted, and the
Central State Administration was reformed. By that time, the interest of Euro-
pean, Canadian and even American capitals in the Island was growing, after
the implementation of the rst investments and the good pace of tourism.
It is no coincidence then that this Law was passed, which, in addition to the
desired transition to the democratic modality dissected in the law, focused on
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distancing Cuba from trade, development aid and foreign investment, in order
to continue betting on the worsening of the living conditions of the popula-
tion in the midst of the economic crisis following the disappearance of the
socialist camp.
The duration, extent and disproportion of the coercive measures applied by
the United States in the case of Cuba reveal the true objective of this regime
of so-called “sanctions”. The creation of internal norms whose sole purpose is
to intervene in the normal insertion of Cuba in the international system, seeks
to legalize intervention in the internal aairs of the island. With this complex
system of unilateral measures, the US not only intends to eliminate all forms of
economic support for the Cuban government and ensure the failure of its pu-
blic functions, but also to dene the actions that will be supported in a foreign
territory, supervised by the US President, to achieve the change of the political
system sovereignly elected by the Cubans.
4. CONCLUSIONS
States may sovereignly determine the limits of their relations with other mem-
bers of international society. Not all “unfriendly” actions violate international
law, while a wide range of conduct constitutes retaliation, and others are con-
sidered countermeasures in response to internationally wrongful acts, subject
to limits set by the international legal order. However, the subjects par ex-
cellence of International Law cannot impose, through their economic, political
or military power, behavioral changes within the scope of the free choice of so-
vereign States, in correspondence with the current international legal system.
The analysis of some relevant sanctions programs reveals that, behind the de-
clared objectives, the purpose of forcing a change of political regime in the
“objective” State is glimpsed. The intention to bring about a fundamental chan-
ge in the internal order of sovereign states has been revealed in these pages
as incompatible with the constitutional principles on which international law
is based. It has also been noted that in the practice of international relations,
a set of simple violations of the international legal order are classied as sanc-
tions. No unilateral coercive measure aimed at regime change in the “aected”
State can be regarded as lawful. By classifying it as an international sanction,
it is intended to dilute its true character as an international wrongful act, by
covering it with an aura of authority.
REVISTA CUBANA DE DERECHO 299
Cuba: sanctioned by the United States?
The proliferation of coercive measures taken by great powers seeking regime
change is a deliberate attempt to rewrite international law to suit their pur-
poses. That is why there is a need for an international legal instrument that
outlaws the use of sanctions outside the collective security mechanism of the
United Nations and enshrines regime change as an illicit purpose, which in the
case of economic sanctions can be equated to an act of economic warfare.
The duration, scope and disproportionality of the coercive measures applied
by the United States in the case of Cuba reveal, behind the declared objectives,
the purpose of forcing a change of political regime on the Island. The creation
of internal norms whose sole purpose is to intervene in the normal insertion of
Cuba in the international system, seeks to legalize the intervention in Havana’s
internal aairs. With this complex system of unilateral measures, the US not
only intends to eliminate all forms of economic support for the Cuban govern-
ment and ensure the failure of its public functions, but also denes the actions
it will support to be carried out in a foreign territory (Cuba), supervised by the
US President, in order to achieve the change of the political system sovereignly
elected by Cubans.
In practice, Washington insists on qualifying as sanctions a set of simple vio-
lations of the international legal order. No unilateral coercive measure aimed
at regime change in another state can be considered in accordance with the
law. By labeling it as an international sanction, the intention is to dilute its true
character as an illegal international act, by dressing it with an aura of authority.
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Recibido: 1/6/2023
Aprobado: 15/7/2023
Este trabajo se publica bajo una Licencia Creative
Commons Attribution-NonCommercial 4.0 International
(CC BY-NC 4.0)
